The Legalities of Stream Interventions: Accretive Changes to New York State\u27s Riparian Doctrine Ahead by Pensley, D. S.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 1 Winter 2008 Article 3
January 2008
The Legalities of Stream Interventions: Accretive
Changes to New York State's Riparian Doctrine
Ahead
D. S. Pensley
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
D. S. Pensley, The Legalities of Stream Interventions: Accretive Changes to New York State's Riparian
Doctrine Ahead, 25 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 105 (2008)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/3
The Legalities of Stream Interventions:
Accretive Changes to New York State's
Riparian Doctrine Ahead?*
D.S. PENSLEY**
I'm going out to clean the pasture spring;
I'll only stop to rake the leaves away
(And wait to watch the water clear, I may):
I sha'n't be gone long.- You come too.
-Robert Frost1
I. INTRODUCTION ................................. 106
II. EVOLUTION AND INCIDENTS OF REGULATED
RIPARIANISM .................................... 113
A. The Shift from Natural Flow to Riparianism .. 113
B. Incidents of Riparianism ....................... 118
C. The Shift to Regulated Riparianism ........... 120
III. TRUE HYPOTHETICALS AND REVISIONIST
CERTAINTIES .................................... 123
A. Beaver Lodges and Artificial Obstructions ..... 123
B. Highways and Floodways ...................... 131
C. Unreasonably Disappearing Streams .......... 138
IV. CONCLUSION .................................... 142
* This Article received Honorable Mention in the 23rd Smith-Babcock-Williams
Student Writing Competition sponsored by the Law & Planning Division of the
American Planning Association (2006).
** Law Clerk to the Honorable Victor J. Wolski, United States Court of Federal
Claims. J.D., Cornell Law School; M.A. Candidate, Cornell University Department of
City and Regional Planning (Historic Preservation Program); A.B., Princeton Univer-
sity (Woodrow Wilson School of Public Policy and International Affairs). E-mail: pen-
sley.ds@gmail.com. This Article is dedicated to the author's children, Chandalar and
Atigun. The author thanks first and foremost Keith Porter, Director of the New York
State Water Resources Institute, for his unflinching encouragement, dry humor, and
gracious critique. Also much appreciation goes to reviewers Jimmy Curatolo of the
Upper Susquehanna Coalition, Deb Grantham of the Cornell Cooperative Extension,
Lee Macbeth of the City of Syracuse, Rick Oestrike of the Fishkill Creek Citizens'
Committee, and Janet Thigpen of the Southern Tier Central Regional Planning and
Development Board. All errors and omissions are the author's own.
1. ROBERT FROST, The Pasture, in You COME Too: FAVORITE POEMS FOR YOUNG
READERS 14 (Hyde Cox ed., Henry Holt & Co. 1959) (1914).
1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Stream corridors, which border watercourses, are critical to
protecting water and soil quality, fish and wildlife habitats, and
recreational opportunities. Allowing cattle free access to streams,
planting crops close to banks and shorelines, and building river-
or streamside homes and other structures inevitably pollute the
water, increase its turbidity and abrasion, and reduce fish and in-
vertebrate populations. 2 Stormwater, melting snow, and even
wind carry sediment, nutrients, fertilizer, and toxic substances as
surface runoff into streams throughout areas where the purifying,
screening, and restraining properties of native vegetation and
trees are absent, and the groundwater storage and recharge capa-
bilities of the underlying floodplain are impaired. 3
Once released from the roots of trees and shrubs, banks
slump as streams undercut (degrade) the floodplain, thereby ac-
celerating erosion. In some cases, the erosion causes the stream
channel to rise (aggrade) and the stream to become shallow and
prone to washouts. 4 Sedimentation fills deep pools and rocky rif-
fles, a streambed pattern which would otherwise provide spawn-
ing habitat for fish, shelter for their young, plant-rich cover for
mature specimens, and breeding grounds for aquatic insects-
which not only constitute food for fish but help streams to flow
unobstructed by eating organic matter in turn.5 Moreover, the
2. See generally J. David Allan, Landscapes and Riverscapes: The Influence of
Land Use on Stream Ecosystems, 35 ANN. REV. OF ECOLOGY, EVOLUTION & SYSTEMAT-
ics 257, 262 (2004) (describing the agencies by which specific land use practices affect
stream ecosystems).
3. See Memorandum from Dep't of Water, City of Syracuse, Comments and Sug-
gested Revisions [on the] 2005 Revised Zoning Law, Town of Skaneateles (Jan. 31,
2005) (on file with Lee Macbeth, Watershed Control Coordinator, Dep't of Water, City
of Syracuse) ("In approving plans, we suggest that any wooded areas left as an undis-
turbed buffer directly below densely developed areas do not contain ephemeral drain-
age channels in bare soil that will conduct water and eroded soil particles to the lake.
Light canopy tree cover with an understory of grass may be more appropriate as a
buffer than dense, light-blocking canopy with little to no vegetative growth on the
floor. Sheet flow, where possible, is preferable to channelized flow."). See generally
FED. INTERAGENCY STREAM RESTORATION WORKING GROUP, STREAM CORRIDOR RESTO-
RATION: PRINCIPLES, PROCESSES, AND PRACTICES 3-6, -14 to -18, -23 to -25 (rev. ed.
2001) [hereinafter RESTORATION], available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/
streamrestoration/PDFFILES/ALL-SCRH-08-01.pdf.
4. JANET THIGPEN & S. TIER CENT. REG'L PLANNING & DEV. BD., STREAM
PROCESSES: A GUIDE TO LING IN HARMONY wiTH STREAMS 19 (2006) [hereinafter
STREAM PROCESSES].
5. BUREAU OF WATER RESOURCE MG'T, Div. OF WATER, N.Y.S. DEP'T OF ENVTL.





lack of overhanging vegetation decreases the number of nearby
terrestrial insects and raises summer water temperatures, thus
stressing fish such as trout.6 In other cases, the erosion scours
and downcuts the channel into a U-shape, a process sometimes
exacerbated by human activities like dredging gravel or snagging
wood debris.7 Downstream floods in times of heavy rain then fre-
quently occur, as do low or no basal flows caused by groundwater
depletion in times of drought.8
Specifically referencing the banks and adjacent land along the
entire length of a watercourse, the stream corridor may also be
generously defined by the valley walls on both sides of the stream
channel.9 It is the starting point of a hydromorphic transition
zone extending from the wet riparian lowlands to the drier up-
lands (tableland areas). In this way the stream corridor repre-
sents the backbone of the watershed ecosystem: embracing all the
land that drains into the tributaries and main river of the water-
shed, plus the range of finely-tuned "ecosystem services" the
stream corridor supports, such as biodiversity, flood control, water
purity, and aesthetic wealth. 10 Ultimately, watershed manage-
ment is the land use management of the stream corridor and any
human modifications to the water's flow (stream interventions).
Throughout the past century, American regional planners
and legislators have intermittently promoted watersheds to inte-
grate land and water resource management and facilitate public
policy organized on hydrologic rather than political lines.1 ' Inter-
est in local watershed management, now found in communities
around the globe, reflects a change of emphasis from harnessing
6. See SCOTT CRAVEN ET AL., THE BENEFITS OF WELL-MANAGED STREAM CORRI-
DORS 3 (1996), available at http://www.cecommerce.uwex.edu/pdfs/G3404.PDF; MAN-
AGEMENT, supra note 5, at 8-9, 11.
7. See generally LUNA B. LEOPOLD, A VIEW OF THE RIVER 244, 280-81 (1994)
(comparing fluvial geomorphology to the state of entropy: the exact consequences of
an event are often unpredictable).
8. See N. LeRoy Poff et al., The Natural Flow Regime: A Paradigm for River
Conservation and Restoration, 47 BIOSCIENCE 769, 773-74 (1997).
9. See VT. AGENCY OF NATURAL RES., VT. STREAM GEOMORPHIC ASSESSMENT app.
E, at E2-9 (2007), available at http://www.anr.state.vt.us/dec/waterq/rivers/docs/as-
sessmenthandbooks/rv-apxecorridordef.pdf.
10. See Jill S. Baron et al., Meeting Ecological and Societal Needs for Freshwater,
12 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1247, 1247-48 (2002); Brian D. Richter et al., Ecologi-
cally Sustainable Water Management: Managing River Flows for Ecological Integrity,
13 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 206, 208 (2003).
11. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed
Management, in New Ground: The Advent of Local Environmental Law 213, 215-16
(John R. Nolon ed., 2003) [hereinafter Tarlock, Potential Role].
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rivers with the concrete infrastructure of economic development to
managing rivers for natural flow patterns and ecologically sus-
tainable futures. 12 Seen primarily as a means of handling the geo-
graphically diffuse issues of habitat conservation and nonpoint
pollution control, watershed management in the United States
also makes evident the prospective "decentering" of environmen-
tal law, that is, a tendency since the 1970s for the deepening en-
gagement of local government in environmental affairs. 13
Given the impact of stream corridor health upon watercourses
and the pressures many riparian lands must bear, a range of re-
storative and remedial strategies have been developed. The first,
given tolerable levels of prior change to the stream corridor, is
best described as "no action." The strategy assumes that over the
long term, nature will restore a stream's dynamic equilibrium,
particularly the appropriate shape to the stream course (hydrau-
lics) and the historic cycle to the instream flow (hydrology).14 Var-
iations on the no-action approach include relocating or moderating
development, flood control levees, clear-cut logging, wetland
drainage, and other detrimental land uses-because, despite the
effort and expense these efforts entail, they "enable do-nothing
management of the stream itself."15 Less ambitious strategies call
for removing obstructions such as upstream jetties and beaver
dams, and clearing sediment deposits and debris jams at bridge
piers and road culverts, but otherwise letting the system be.16
At one extreme from the no-action approach is a major re-
working of the stream, which may include dredging or construct-
ing a highly controlled channel (for instance, by piping a stream
through an urban area, or by paving or walling a watercourse). 17
At the other extreme are a variety of actions which may be catego-
rized as "natural stream restoration." These site-specific strate-
gies combat energy excesses, the gravamen of all erosion- and
flood-related grief, by the planting of riparian species (commonly
willows) at problem sites to decrease the impact of stream energy,
and by the placement of rocks or logs in the stream channel to
12. See SANDRA POSTEL & BRIAN D. RICHTER, RIVERs FOR LIFE: MANAGING WATER
FOR PEOPLE AND NATURE 1-5 (2003).
13. See Tarlock, Potential Role, supra note .11, at 219.
14. STREAM PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 15.
15. E-mail from Janet Thigpen, Flood Mitigation Specialist, S. Tier Cent. Reg'l
Planning & Dev. Bd. (October 6, 2006) (on file with author).
16. See STREAM PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 14-15, 40.




dissipate stream energy.' 8 Comparable techniques focus on stabi-
lizing streambanks through mounding riprap (large angular rock)
and building retaining walls, constructing rock vanes and other
habitat (instream) structures to alter flow patterns, and disman-
tling channelization (including culverts and concrete sectioning)
to re-establish meanders based on mathematic principles that fos-
ter immunity to rapid adjustment. 19 One strategy that comple-
ments any of the above approaches calls for maintaining or
establishing a vegetated buffer alongside the watercourse: either a
narrow band hugging the stream or a network of wetlands stretch-
ing far into the floodplain. 20
Beyond these spot fixes are wider ecological strategies
founded upon the connection between viable stream corridors and
sustainable watersheds:
As water flows on its way to the sea, it moves through fresh-
water systems in three spatial dimensions: longitudinal (up-
stream-downstream), lateral (channel-floodplain, or wetland-
lake margin), and vertical (surface water-groundwater). These
dimensions represent functional linkages among ecosystem
compartments over time. Bodies of freshwater are ultimately
the recipients of materials generated from the landscape, hence
they are greatly influenced by terrestrial processes, including
human modifications of land.21
18. STREAM PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 39.
19. RESTORATION, supra note 3, at 8-34, -64, -72 to -73; STREAM PROCESSES, supra
note 4, at 26-30, 37-38. Although a stream-left to its own devices-will eventually
change course, these calculated and calibrated instream structures impose a perma-
nent series of meanders upon it. See Site Visit and Interview with Barry Goodrich,
former member of the Town Bd. of Caroline, N.Y. & Darby Kiley, Project Manager,
Cayuga Lake Watershed Intermunicipal Org., in Slaterville, N.Y. (Mar. 13, 2006).
20. See RESTORATION, supra note 3, at 8-10 to -11, -14. In other words, "Stream
management is floodplain management." Site Visit and Interview with Kevin
Olvany, Watershed Program Manager, Watershed Council, in Canandaigua, N.Y.
(Mar. 30, 2006).
Expanding upon the concept of the vegetated buffer, best management practices
for active farmlands take the form of cover crops (growing cereals on recently-har-
vested cropland), conservation tillage (minimizing disturbances to the surface soil),
and enhanced nutrient management (fertilizing with fifteen percent less nitrogen).
See What Are Tributary Strategies?, BACKGROUNDER (Chesapeake Bay Program, An-
napolis, Md.), Apr. 2004, at 2, available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/trib-
strats -backgrounderfinal.pdf. Remedial strategies for urban areas include low-
impact development practices (e.g., planting rain gardens and establishing roof gar-
dens, maintaining rain barrels, and disconnecting gutter downspouts from municipal
stormwater systems), and erosion and sediment control (e.g., building silt fences
where lawns meet city streams). Id. at 2-3.
21. Baron, supra note 10, at 1249 (citations omitted).
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Studies since the 1960s have documented hydrologic and hy-
draulic responses to altered flow regimes, including the potential
for a lowered water table level throughout the watershed, espe-
cially but not exclusively due to surface water withdrawals. 22 The
scientific community has ceased as a general rule to support con-
ventional instream flow values, which protect up to a specified
level of water-typically a single year-round value based on the
needs of one fish species-and allocate the rest to the needs of de-
velopment and other human activity.23 Instead, many research-
ers presently advocate a system which, by setting aside a fixed
amount of water for urban, industrial, or agricultural use, protects
a river's natural character through minimizing deviations from
historic flow patterns and thus preserves the natural variability of
hydraulic conditions. 24 It may be argued that the traditional
study of "river manipulation" at the expense of surrounding lands
is yielding to a debate on the proper relationship of water law to
land use planning, the outcome of which is foundational to a range
of adaptive management schemes. 25
Against this backdrop, water and soil conservation district
personnel and other resource managers are quick to point out the
legal issues that arise in conjunction with stream corridor mainte-
nance-issues that only sometimes originate with concerned citi-
zens facing unruly waters, and oftentimes arise with water
22. See Poff, supra note 8, at 773, 775. See generally ROBERT GLENNON, WATER
FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 39-44
(2002) (explaining how the terms "groundwater" and "surface water" merely locate
water in the hydrologic cycle at any given point in time).
23. See Nicole Silk et al., Turning Instream Flow Water Rights Upside Down, 7
RIVERS 298, 299-301 (2000).
24. See, e.g., id. at 303. Five interacting components (the master variable) attest
to the complexity of the natural flow regime: magnitude of discharge (volume per unit
of time), frequency of occurrence, duration (relative to a particular flow event or a
composite value of events), timing (predictability expressed formally or informally),
and flashiness (the rate of flow changes). Poff, supra note 8, at 770-71.
25. Compare COMM. ON OPPORTUNITIES IN THE HYDROLOGIC ScIs., WATER SCI. &
TECH. BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITIES IN THE HYDROLOGIC SCIENCES
40-42 (1991) (commenting that the definitive early work of American hydrology con-
centrated on the physics of the hydrologic cycle and ignored human land and water
use), with Craig Anthony Arnold, Integrating Water Controls and Land Use Controls:
New Ideas and Old Obstacles, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND
USE? 1, 7-33 (Craig Anthony Arnold ed., 2005) [hereinafter WET GROWTH] (defining
the nascent wet growth concept as "the interrelationship of water resources and land
use [that] is one of the hottest topics in land use today"). European policies towards
open space and water are similarly changing. See Stewart J. Clarke et al., Linking
Form and Function: Towards an Eco-Hydromorphic Approach to Sustainable River





practitioners' own uncertainty as to the proper scope of their offi-
cial or volunteer responsibilities. The overarching question is:
Who owns the stream? The question is more easily tackled when
broken into a cascade of inquiries: Who has the right to use the
waters of the stream? Who is responsible for maintaining the
stream? Who owns the stream bed when it surfaces, and the land
alongside when it is subsumed? And finally, who is liable for dam-
ages wrought by upstream or downstream floods caused by stream
interventions or by land owners' failures to remedy natural in-
stream hazards?
Beginning in the late 1950s, legislative incursions throughout
the eastern United States have modified the common law regime
of riparian rights to create regulated riparianism.26 At first
glance, the case law existing parallel to the statutes provides an-
swers to the above questions premised on the basic idea that
water rights are an incident of land ownership along a water-
course and subject only to the liability rule of reasonable use. But
a view of freshwaters within a landscape or systems context raises
still finer-grained concerns such as allowing stream access to non-
commercial organizations for conducting observatory and repara-
tive stream walks; limiting the availability of groundwater to
subdivision developers; ensuring that private property owners fos-
ter stream health through appropriate vegetative buffers; tying
concerns of water quality to those of water quantity and water
control; and upholding local regulations that promote reductions
in water usage, efficiencies in conveying and storing water, and
shifts from wasteful to higher-value uses. Although riparian doc-
trine (as ostensibly established) may not appear relevant to these
modern-day issues, an examination of contemporary and historic
New York State judicial opinions, if grounded in some familiarity
with the situations that riparians (waterfront landowners) face,
very much eases tackling the watershed-scale ramifications of
adaptive management in general and the injuries of stream inter-
ventions in specific.
As one property scholar reminds us, "Far from being a mod-
ern invention of goal-oriented judges, change is the unchanging
chronicle of water jurisprudence.... New needs have always gen-
26. See Patricia K. Flood & Kenneth R. Wright, Summary of Water Rights Law in
the 31 Eastern States, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 105, 106
(Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1998) [hereinafter WATER RIGHTS].
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erated new doctrines and, thereby, new property rights."27 It is
widely accepted that the agricultural and usufructory water law
doctrine of natural flow morphed into the riparian doctrine of rea-
sonable use in service to the needs of a burgeoning industrial
economy. 28 The shift to the comprehensive regulation of these
rights was equally subtle, resulting from "incremental changes in
earlier systems rather than a conscious design to revolutionize the
system of water rights. ... [T]he realization that something truly
new in water law had emerged did not occur for another several
decades." 29 The task of this Article, then, is to determine whether
New York's riparian doctrine is obsolete in the face of regulated
riparianism or whether, should the statutory regime lack the ca-
pacity and flexibility to take a holistic approach, common law doc-
trine has the wherewithal to grow and face the ecological
challenges of the new century.
Part I summarizes the evolution of New York's riparian doc-
trine and sketches its version of regulated riparianism. Part II
analyzes more recent case law to offer a quasi-doctrinal, quasi-
revisionist perspective on the changing nature of "the law at the
water's edge."30 To provide an instrument for practice, this part is
framed by the two sets of questions posed above and is focused by
the observations of water resource professionals and volunteers
throughout New York, specifically the counties of Broome,
Chemung, Chenango, Dutchess, Onondaga, Ontario, Rockland,
27. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water
Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 268-69 (1990); cf JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF
WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 226-32 (2004) (associating a "new riparian theory re-
emphasizing natural rights" with the English decision of Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep.
692 (K.B. 1833), which extinguished the more recent doctrine of prior appropriation,
characterized by possessive intent).
28. See THEODORE STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND
THE WATERS OF NEW ENGLAND 140-44 (1991); see also Carol M. Rose, Energy and
Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261,
266 (1990) (concluding, "[T]he most important uses of water presented the features of
a common pool, in which the total value to riparians was increased by allowing some
modicum of damage from each riparian's use so long as the bulk of the river flow was
retained for all."). At least one New York decision, however, relied upon the long-
superseded English doctrine of "ancient watercourses" (ancient use doctrine) to hold a
landowner liable for filling in a spring and its channel, where the waters once flowed
to plaintiffs property. See Bell v. Townsend, 26 N.Y. Weekly Digest 395, 396 (Sup. Ct.
Gen. Term 4th Dep't 1887).
29. WATER LAWS COMM., AM. SOC'Y OF CIv. ENG'RS, REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL
WATER CODE, at viii (Joseph W. Dellapena ed., 2004) [hereinafter WATER CODE].
30. The phrase borrows from the title of Robert W. Adler's article, The Law at the
Water's Edge: Limits to "Ownership" of Aquatic Ecosystems, in WET GROWTH, supra
note 25, at 201.
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Schuyler, Steuben, Tioga, Tompkins, and Ulster.31 Stepping be-
yond fact-bound litigation set in morphologic locations, the Article
concludes by offering a fresh spin on the instrumentalist role of an
evolving riparianism.
II. EVOLUTION AND INCIDENTS OF REGULATED
RIPARIANISM
A. The Shift from Natural Flow to Riparianism
Prior to the nineteenth century, the Anglo-American common
law of watercourses clung to an unequivocal principle: aqua currit
et debet currere, ut currere solebat-literally, water flows and
ought to flow, as it has customarily flowed, "so that all through
whose land it runs may enjoy the privilege of using it."32 English
jurisprudence initially held that "[riunning water is not in its na-
ture private property"33 and early American water law cases
echoed the premise of the inherent good of natural flow.3 4 The use
of water constituted a usufructory property interest, i.e., a limited
31. Rationale for this Article's deliberate narrow focus is best articulated by a
former town supervisor of Denning, a little-changing hamlet in the Catskills: "Local
communities are better capable of taking care of their water themselves. They know
their water, they know their aquifers, they know their streams." Telephone Interview
with Clay Brooks, former town supervisor of Denning, N.Y. (Nov. 28, 2005). It is use-
ful to think of water law as a legal regime ineluctably shaped by the physical reality of
a bounded place.
32. JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES § 93 (5th ed.
1854). Good reason exists to turn to a Latin maxim for this common law principle,
considering its roots in Roman jurisprudence and its civil law progeny. See EUGENE
F. WARE, ROMAN WATER LAW § 39 (1905) (translating from the Pandects of Justinian
(Pomponius): "Many may take away water from a river, but in such manner only that
their neighbors are not injured, or, if the stream is not large, those on the other
side."); see also Richard C. Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems
and Proposals, 66 Ky. L.J. 191, 196 nn.31 & 32 and accompanying text (1977) (sup-
porting the respective theses that riparian doctrine developed from the French civil
law or the English common law). See generally Samuel C. Wiel, Running Water, 22
HARv. L. REV. 190, 190-99 (1908-09) (elaborating on the place of running water-
along with the air, the sea, and the wild animals-within the "negative community" of
things the Justinian Institutes viewed as common by nature until reduced to the con-
trol of any one person); Samuel C. Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority,
33 HARv. L. REV. 133, 134 (1919-20) ("Things French in 1804 were welcome in
America. England was an enemy but recently fought off, while France was a friend
who had given aid, and in the following period when most of the American law was
beginning to be made, French authorities were sympathetically used in America.").
33. Williams v. Morland, 107 Eng. Rep. 620, 622 (K.B. 1824).
34. See, e.g., Arnold v. Foot, 12 Wend. 330, 331-32 (N.Y. 1834) (quoting Judge
Joseph Story: "'The natural stream, existing by the bounty of Providence for the bene-
fit of the land through which it flows, is an incident annexed to the land itself.'" (cita-
tion omitted)).
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right of enjoyment-not ownership-which ensured that the
water of a stream or river would reach the next landowner down-
stream, and so on. One frequently-referenced New York decision
expressed the understanding as follows: 'Water, when reduced to
possession, is property, and it may be bought and sold and have a
market value, but it must be in actual possession, subject to con-
trol and management. Running water in natural streams is not
property and never was."35 That being said, the limited right of
use was as strong as any other property interest; the riparian
need not have previously enjoyed her waters to defend them
against would-be appropriators. 36
With industrial activity on the rise, New York's judiciary an-
ticipated that the entrepreneurial use of the valuable fluid re-
source would unavoidably decrease the amount of water available
for fellow riparians, but should nevertheless be allowed.37 Where
conflict over a thirty-foot-high dam arose among some twenty
mills on the Matthias Kill, for instance, one early opinion pro-
claimed that the owners of the lower mills "must participate in the
benefits of the stream, to a reasonable extent, although the ...
profits [of the owners of the upper mill] may be thereby less-
ened ... ."38 Despite opportunity at this time to eliminate ripari-
ans' transaction costs in bargaining one-on-one (or suing) for
permission to appropriate water upstream, judges did not initially
embrace the concept of reasonable use wholesale, but rather lim-
ited consumption to natural (primary) needs.39 Therefore, the
state courts approved "ordinary" domestic uses for water such as
35. City of Syracuse v. Stacey, 62 N.E. 354, 355, 356 (N.Y. 1901) (holding that
riparian claimants, grantees of "water power rights," were not entitled to an award
equivalent to the monetary value of their reservoir when the city condemned their
right to divert water from Lake Skaneateles).
36. See, e.g., Gray v. Vill. of Fort Plain, 94 N.Y.S. 698, 699-700 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1905) (affirming an award of $450 and an injunction where plaintiff potentially lost
ten horsepower from falls on his land due to an upstream diversion). But see
Maylender v. Fulton County Elec. & Gas Co., 227 N.Y.S. 209, 215 (Sup. Ct. Fulton
County 1928) (dismissing an amended complaint for failure to state a claim because
"there is no allegation anywhere that plaintiff has ever used the waters of this creek
or that he ever intends to do so").
37. See Clinton v. Myers, 46 N.Y. 511, 517 (1871); see also T.E. Lauer, Reflections
on Riparianism, 35 Mo. L. REV. 1, 8 n.24 and accompanying text (1970) (discussing
the landmark decision of Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No.
14,312) (Story, J.)).
38. Merritt v. Brinkerhoff, 17 Johns. 306, 321 (N.Y. 1820) (having earlier rea-
soned, "this rule requires of [the owners of the upper mill] no more than to conform to
the principle upon which their right is founded").





drinking, bathing, washing, keeping fish or fowl, and watering
cattle, even when the natural flow of water available to down-
stream users was diminished, yet scrutinized the more conspicu-
ous and "extraordinary" use of water for irrigation or machinery
with an eye towards commensurability with local uses and propor-
tionality to stream size and strength.40
Clinton v. Myers, decided in 1871, involved a plaintiff who-in
seeking to secure water power during dry seasons-not only deep-
ened the outlet of a lake and barred it with a trunk and gate
mechanism, but also built a dam approximately three-and-a-half
miles downstream at the site of his cotton combing operation. 41
Taking its lead from an 1859 decision by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, New York's highest judiciary held that
the dam, and the factory it served, were proper only insofar as
"[tihe machinery [is] such as the power of the stream, in its ordi-
nary stages, is adequate to propel."42 Aided by neither measure-
ments nor calculations, the court quite curiously explained that
damming and then discharging waters during times of drought
was an activity per se equivalent to ordinary stream flows and
hence allowed, but storing and then discharging the surplus from
ordinary stream flows (the purpose of the trunk and gate mecha-
nism) resulted in an "unusual quantity" inundating downstream
users and was disallowed. 43
Almost imperceptibly, reasonable use elided into beneficial
use, that "public interest promoted by the erection of mills and
manufactories," and provided state judges a forgiving standard for
passing on the legality of the newer technologies and the newer
harms they inflicted on neighbors. 44 As the nineteenth century
40. See, e.g., Pierson v. Speyer, 70 N.E. 799 (N.Y. 1904); Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co.,
58 N.E. 142 (N.Y. 1900); see also Hammond v. Fuller, 1 Paige Ch. 196 (N.Y. Ch. 1828)
(ordering defendants to lower their dam and pay damages if backflow caused Paradox
Creek to exceed its natural level where intersecting a neighbor's lot).
41. Clinton v. Myers, 46 N.Y. 511, 511-12 (1871). Plaintiffs landholdings were
the entire lakeshore and the lake's outlet and the factory site downstream; defen-
dant's farm and sawmill straddled the stream between the lake outlet and the factory.
Id. at 512.
42. Id. at 518 (citing Gould v. Boston Duck Co., 79 Mass. 442, 452-53 (1859)).
43. See id. at 518-19.
44. See, e.g., Prentice v. Geiger, 74 N.Y. 341, 345 (1878) (upholding defendant's
right to operate a steam mill, which-unlike its predecessor sawmill-operated in
periods of both high and low water and filled plaintiffs downstream pond with saw-
dust and other refuse that caught against the dam and sank); Storm King Paper Co.
v. Firth Carpet Co., 172 N.Y.S. 33, 36 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1918) (upholding defen-
dant's right to wash wool in Moodna Creek despite allegations of microscopic fibers
clogging the filters of plaintiffs mill).
2008]
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progressed, the concept of property changed "from a static agra-
rian conception entitling an owner to undisturbed enjoyment, to a
dynamic, instrumental, and more abstract view ... that empha-
sized the newly paramount virtues of productive use and enjoy-
ment."45 By the century's end, the property regime of natural flow
(entitlement as a right) had given way to the liability regime of
beneficial use (damages as a remedy paid by the highest-valued
user, realistically, the one with the deepest pockets). 46
At the same time, even if the substantial preservation of the
"natural size, flow and purity" of watercourses in the Empire
State became an improbable bromide, courts paradoxically in-
sisted upon naturalness as an outer limit of familiarity or custom,
and so moderated the pace of change in water use. In Strobel v.
Kerr Salt Company, for example, the court viewed the diversion
from Oatka Creek of 150 gallons of water per minute, ten hours a
day, as something "new and peculiar, for it involves its utter de-
struction as water .... The loss is not incidental by diminution
through the process of using the water, as in most cases presented
to the courts, but is absolute by means of dissipation through the
atmosphere."47 As part of the salt mining and refining process,
defendant channeled stream water over two deep deposits of rock
salt, piped the resulting brine to the surface and into boilers and
pans, then haphazardly scattered the scaly salt and lime by-
product over the ground.48 The court's pique at this "new and ex-
traordinary method of using the water, hitherto unknown in the
state," equaled its dismay at the saltiness of the modified stream,
for it was undisputed that "at times . . . cattle will not drink it
45. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
31 (1992); see also Clinton, 46 N.Y. at 515 (observing, yet claiming to give the observa-
tion no weight: Plaintiffs "factory is of great value, which will be much impaired, if
not wholly destroyed, by not enjoying the right to control and use the water in the
manner claimed by him in this action").
46. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV 1089, 1106-11,
1115-24 (1972).
47. Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 58 N.E. 142, 145 (N.Y. 1900); cf. Maylender v. Fulton
County Gas & Elec. Co., 227 N.Y.S. 209, 215 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County 1928) (dis-
missing an amended complaint for failure to state a claim by explaining in part,
"there are no allegations in the pleading that [defendant's] dam, works and reservoir
were not built in conformity with the fall of the land upon which the structures were
erected, or that they are not adapted to the size, character and flow of the stream").
48. See Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 49 N.Y.S. 1144, 1144 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't




unless forced to by necessity, fish are destroyed in great numbers,
vegetation is killed and machinery rusted."49
Continuing the theme of requisite naturalness, a small subset
of these older riparian cases engage not so much with the question
of watercourse diversions, but with other kinds of disturbances to
natural flows.5 0 In Pollett v. Long, the Court of Appeals found de-
fendant liable for negligently constructing and maintaining a mill
dam.5 1 An autumn storm caused an Erie County stream to rise
and tear out defendant's structure, following which such a large
volume of water was discharged that the next two dams down-
stream also breached.52 The judge scornfully dismissed defen-
dant's argument that the swollen waters "had before broken the
middle dam and thereby increased the volume and power of mis-
chief' because the weak dam (an artificial instream obstruction),
and not the natural force of the freshet, represented the initial
domino for the damaging series of events. 53
Similar reasoning is evident in Spink v. Corning, where a low-
land defendant obstructed the creek that drained her neighbor's
upland parcel and flooded his crops thereby. 54 Complicating the
adjudication, the parties' predecessors in interest had four de-
cades earlier "agreed upon a plan of cleaning out, deepening, and
straightening the channel of this natural watercourse . . . a dis-
tance of more than a mile," which they implemented by removing
the loose rock of the streambed with pickaxes, crowbars, and dy-
namite.55 The intermediate court distinguished the improved nat-
ural watercourse from a "wholly . .. artificial ditch or channel,"
which defendant would have been permitted to obstruct, much
49. See Strobel, 58 N.E. at 147. But see Pierson v. Speyer, 70 N.E. 799, 799 (N.Y.
1904) (finding reasonable the construction of a reservoir "for both ornamental and
domestic purposes" despite a decline in water flow to downstream rose growers due
evaporation).
50. See, e.g., Pollett v. Long, 56 N.Y. 200 (1874) (a dam which breached and swept
out two dams downstream); Waffle v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 53 N.Y. 11 (1873) (ditches
which collected surface water from lands above plaintiffs riparian property and saw-
mill); Olney v. Culluloo Park Co., 169 N.Y.S. 843 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1918) (a water-
course which was filled in and rerouted through an underground pipe); Spink v.
Coming, 70 N.Y.S. 143 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1901) (loose rock which was placed on a
streambed).
51. Pollett, 56 N.Y. at 206-08.
52. Id. at 204.
53. See id. at 207.
54. See Spink, 70 N.Y.S. at 143.
55. See id. at 145.
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like revoking a license for access. 56 Admittedly, these earlier
courts' understanding of naturalness may at times have differed
from that of water managers in the twenty-first century, but their
jurisprudential emphasis is still valid today.57
B. Incidents of Riparianism
At least one commentator has confidently declared, "Ripari-
anism is reasonable use."5 8 Perhaps, but the term "riparian
rights" is broader yet: traditionally described as "a bundle of legal
rights concerning the relation of the owner of the bank of a stream
to various features of the stream."59 Rights complementary to
reasonable use that help comprise the riparian bundle include the
right to access the water, to build a wharf or pier out into the
water, to take possession of accretions (alluvium), and to enjoy the
exclusive use of the bed of non-navigable streams and other "pri-
vate" waters.60 A lower court framed the doctrine by generalizing
56. See id. at 146; see also Olney, 169 N.Y.S. at 845 (determining that a stream,
filled in for a portion of its length and routed underground, "was still a watercourse
although flowing through a pipe.... [A]ny obstruction thereto by the defendant, the
effect of which was to back the water onto plaintiffs land, violated plaintiffs right
based on the doctrine 'Aqua currit . . ").
57. Compare Waffle v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 53 N.Y. 11, 13 (1873) (holding that "defen-
dant had an absolute right to drain the surface water upon its land into the stream
which was its natural outlet through ditches constructed upon its own land" despite
increased stream magnitude and flashiness), with Telephone Interview with Rick
Oestrike, Chair, Fishkill Creek Citizens' Comm. (Nov. 21, 2005) (describing the "ero-
sive slug of drainpipes" which collect stormwater and other runoff from impermeable
surfaces and propel the water with great volume and velocity into existing water-
courses, exacerbating erosion and turbidity).
58. Lauer, supra note 37, at 3.
59. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 6.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed., 2001 repl. vol.) [hereinafter Del-
lapenna, Introduction]; see also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Cutter, 492 N.Y.S.2d
137, 139 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1985), affd, 492 N.E.2d 398 (N.Y. 1985) ("The riparian
right is natural and inherent, and a part of the estate of each riparian owner."). Ripa-
rian rights attach neither to artificial waterbodies nor to diffuse surface waters. Aus-
ness, supra note 32, at 197; cf Cook v. McClure, 58 N.Y. 437, 440-41 (1874) (holding
that the boundary of an artificial pond is fixed, therefore an appurtenant property
owner is not entitled to the land left dry when the pond recedes).
60. Dellapenna, Introduction, supra note 59, § 6.01(a). The "non-navigability" re-
ferred to here is a statement of law, not a question of fact. English common law re-
garded all freshwater rivers as non-navigable, and consequently fixed title to the bed
of saltwater (tidal) streams in the sovereign and title to the bed of freshwater streams
in the riparian owners. The particulars of title to the underwater bed were irrelevant
to the public right of passage and transportation; riparian owners could legally bar
public access only when the stream was too narrow or too shallow to be navigable-in-
fact. See Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 94 N.E. 199, 202 (N.Y. 1911).
Adjudicating ownership of the bed of the Oswego River, which is in parts navigable-
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/3
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that "riparian rights connote the right and profit to the owner of
the upland arising from its connection with the water such as the
easement of passage and use."61 The conservatory prohibition
against non-riparian use thus footnotes the reasonable use re-
quirement: The water of a stream may be used upon riparian land
(or that portion of the riparian tract found in the watershed), but
not elsewhere. 62
The common law understanding that only the owners of prop-
erty bordering a watercourse enjoy riparian rights is rooted in the
appurtenancy requirement. Namely, for land to be defined as ri-
parian it must be contiguous to, and have actual contact with, the
water.63 A property owner whose land is separated from the
water by another's parcel, regardless how slender, enjoys no ripa-
rian rights.64 Because rivers and their myriad cousins are among
in-fact but is not navigable-at-law, one New York appellate judge clarified, "I know of
no exceptions in this state to the common-law rule of riparian ownership of the beds of
freshwater streams, where not constituting boundary lines, other than the two rivers
[i.e., the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers, which beds were excepted in grants made to
early settlers by the Dutch government]." Id. at 202-03. See generally People v.
Waite, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (N.Y. County Ct. St. Lawrence County 1979) (qualify-
ing, 'The ownership of a stream bed does not of itself impart to the riparian owner an
exclusive right to the waters flowing over the bed .... [H]is use thereof cannot be
inconsistent with a like reasonable use of the water by owners above and below
him."); John A. Humbach, Public Rights in the Navigable Streams of New York, 6
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 461, 487-513 (1989) (exhaustively reviewing case law on the
ownership of streambeds).
61. Allen v. Potter, 316 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (Sup. Ct. Special Term Yates County
1970).
62. See, e.g., Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 58 N.E. 142, 145 (N.Y. 1900) ("The diversion
is as complete as if the water had been pumped over the hills bordering the Oatka
valley and turned into another creek .... "); Samuels v. Armstrong, 93 N.Y.S. 24, 27
(Sup. Ct. Trial Term Delaware County 1905) (enjoining the riparian defendant from
diverting the Tremperskill to make ice for sale to residents of a nearby village). But
see United Paper Bd. Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper Co., 123 N.E. 200, 203 (N.Y. 1919)
(holding that riparian rights are severable and may be granted to a party not the
owner of the streambank). See generally Ausness, supra note 32, 203-04 (describing
the watershed limitation across jurisdictions). Contra Lauer, supra note 37, at 6-7
n. 14 (debunking the conservatory claims of the secondary literature by uncovering:
"Eastern states favoring the watershed limitation: 0; Eastern states opposing it: 1.").
63. Cf Kyser v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 271 N.Y.S. 182, 186 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1934) (noting that the right to use a stream's waters is incidental to the ownership of
its bank and therefore part of the riparian estate).
64. See James N. Christman, Riparian Doctrine, in WATER RIGHTS, supra note 26,
at 21-22. Two formal and sometimes opposing tests address the situation where a
large tract touches the water in only one small place. The unity-of-title test would
treat the entire tract as riparian so long as it were owned by a single entity. In con-
trast, the source-of-title test would treat the tract as riparian only insofar it has been
historically riparian; once it has been subdivided from the land touching the water,
even if later reunited under one owner, it never regains riparian status. Id; see also
15
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the most dynamic of all topographic features, and upstream inter-
ventions are exceedingly common, the categorical approach of ap-
purtenancy makes it difficult for courts and landowners to
distribute responsibilities fairly and consistently-particularly
when a stream drifts or surges (erodes) from a recorded boundary
survey, neighboring riparians lay competing claims to a newly-
emerged island, a watercourse is channelized and relocated as
part of a flood control project, the present high- or low-water
mark or wetland boundary differs from historical patterns, or new
waterbodies are established when a river is dammed or disappear
when a dam is removed. 65 Although riparian disputes typically
question the accuracy of surveys of the beds and banks of streams
and lakes and rely for resolution on tools as varied as surveyed
meander lines (roughly paralleling the water body), metered
stream flow measurements, photogrammetry (the scaled interpre-
tation of aerial photographs), and tree ring analyses, 66 these fac-
tual inquiries must ultimately serve the legal concepts of
ownership and obligation.67
C. The Shift to Regulated Riparianism
At its essence, regulated riparianism departs from common
law riparian doctrine in the former's insistence that, a few excep-
tions aside, water may be withdrawn and used from an identified
surface supply or underground source upon issuance of a permit
by the state within which the withdrawal takes place.68 Water
practitioners ascribe the shift to regulated riparianism in the east-
ern United States to increasingly frequent and severe water
shortages caused by recurring droughts, heightened demand for
water, significant water pollution, and measurable global climate
14 WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY § 151.06[2] (2006) (claiming that New
York State follows the source-of-title test and citing Durham v. Ingrassia, 431
N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980)).
65. See Kenneth R. Wright, Water Rights Engineering, in WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 26, at 80-81.
66. See id. at 81.
67. See generally Olivia S. Choe, Appurtenancy Reconceptualized: Managing
Water in an Era of Scarcity, 113 YALE L.J. 1909, 1929-37 (2004) (hypothesizing that
the success of the appurtenancy doctrine was limited relative to the reasonable use
doctrine).
68. See WATER CODE, supra note 29, § 6R-1-01; see also A. Dan Tarlock, Recon-
necting Property Rights to Watersheds, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 69,
90-91 (2000) [hereinafter Tarlock, Property Rights] ("Regulated riparianism has three
general purposes: (1) to collect information about use, (2) to subject large ground and
surface withdrawals to a permit system, and (3) to address the environmental and




change.6 9 Inadequacies of the common law regime became in-
creasingly apparent in the face of allocation problems; the social,
economic, and technological difficulties of a proportionate reduc-
tion (as opposed to a prioritized reduction) in all water uses during
times of shortage; and the cumulative impact of a large number of
individually reasonable uses.70
With a focus on efficiency, conservation, and equity, the per-
mitting system that is the hallmark of regulated riparianism
grows out of states' police power to protect public health, safety,
and welfare. 71 Like pure riparianism, regulated riparianism is
guided by a notion of reasonable use, alternately denoted "benefi-
cial," "reasonable-beneficial," or "equitable."72 Contrasting with
the ex post role of the judiciary within the common law, the re-
sponsible agency within a regulated riparian system determines
ex ante the reasonableness of a proposed water use through state-
wide or regional permitting requirements. 73 But permitting re-
quirements can cover only so many concerns, as the Regulated
Riparian Model Water Code acknowledges (with a self-conscious
prolixity disproportionate to the substance conveyed):
Today, the main threats to the availability of water in eastern
States, both as to quantity and as to quality, are not pollution or
withdrawal, but the physical and ecological transformation by
human intervention of water sources and the lands on or in
which the sources are found. Dams not only "withdraw" water,
but also disrupt temperature and nutrient patterns on which
rivers depend for their ecological diversity-as does the
"straightening" of a river. Repeated withdrawals of water from
water sources both deplete the quantity of water remaining and
alter the waste assimilative and other natural aspects of the
water source, often to the detriment of potential users-human
and non-human. Sediments from farms suffocate many small
69. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 59, § 9.01 [hereinafter Dellapenna, Riparianism].
70. See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First
Century, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 539, 559-65 (2004) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Twenty-First
Century]; George William Sherk, Eastern Water Law: Trends in State Legislation, 9
VA. ENvTL. L.J. 287, 288-91 (1990).
71. See WATER CODE, supra note 29, at ix, §§ 1R-1-01 to -12; see also Sherk, supra
note 70, at 293-94 (identifying eight legislative trends in the early movement towards
regulated riparianism).
72. See WATER CODE, supra note 29, at viii.
73. See id. at § 6R-2-01 and commentary. See generally Dellapenna, Riparianism,




PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
forms of aquatic life. Vacationers who cut down trees to im-
prove the view from summer homes may erode stream banks or
lakeshores.... The Regulated Riparian Model Code addresses
only direct use of the water .... [I]t does not address directly
human activities other than direct uses that, often unintention-
ally, despoil the waters of the State.7 4
The admission surprises all the more, keeping in mind that the
comprehensive model legislation advocates such progressive ele-
ments as water use fees, alternative dispute resolution, and state-
wide data collection.75
Although the date commonly given for New York's adoption of
regulated riparianism is a middle-of-the-pack 1979 (with Iowa
leading in 1957 and Alabama closing in 1993),76 general consen-
sus is that "its state level regulated riparianism management pro-
gram, with respect to water allocation and withdrawal, is limited
compared to the more comprehensive regimes seen in Delaware,
New Jersey, and Maryland." 77 The Water Resources Law (Article
15 of the New York State Environmental Conservation Law) privi-
leges a multitude of unregulated uses by requiring private entities
and public corporations to obtain a permit from the New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) only
when acquiring, conserving, developing, using, or distributing
water for a public water supply or irrigation. 7s In granting, deny-
ing, or conditioning a permit, the agency must determine, inter
alia, whether public necessity justifies the proposed project and
whether the applicant (1) has considered other extant or future
sources of supply, (2) has planned to protect the watershed during
74. WATER CODE, supra note 29, at ix. Similarly, one overview of water manage-
ment programs throughout the mid-Atlantic states focuses on five "evolving themes
and issues," all of which relate to withdrawing and consuming water, or to sharing
waters trans-watershed or interstate. See R. Timothy Weston, Evolving Issues in
Eastern Water Law: Evolving Water Resource Issues in the Mid-Atlantic Region
32-36 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript presented to the American Bar Associa-
tion, Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources, at the 13th Section Fall
Meeting).
75. See Dellapenna, Twenty-First Century, supra note 70, at 587-90.
76. See, e.g. ,WATER CODE, supra note 29, at vii-ix.
77. Weston, supra note 74, at 11. See generally Nicholas A. Robinson, New York,
in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 537, pts. I-III (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed., 2005
repl. vol.) (surveying the statutory and common law framework for utilizing and pro-
tecting water resources across New York State).




construction, and (3) has implemented a water conservation
program.79
Furthermore, New York State prohibits altering a stream (or
small ponds found within its course) without a permit from
DEC.80 The statute assumes these alterations are reasonable and
lawful, provided no harm occurs to other individuals who may
have a private interest in these waters.8 ' Harm is defined as
"[i]nterference with a present use of the water by the complaining
party or an interference with the complaining party's present en-
joyment of riparian land occurring prior to suit," or "[a] decrease
in the market value of the complaining party's interest in riparian
land occurring prior to suit."8 2 Despite the importance of stream
corridor health and restoration, evidently the Water Resources
Law neither provides incentive to determine the reason behind
the ostensible interference or to evaluate whether a party's failure
to ameliorate a known and harmful condition might qualify as an
interference, nor does it identify any overarching ecological or eco-
nomic policy the statute was enacted to serve. The stock forms
appended to the statute-Complaint to Enjoin Obstruction of
Stream, Prayer for Relief from Stream Diversion, Answer of Pre-
scriptive Right to Use Stream, and Petition for Determination of
Rights in Return of Sewage Effluent-presume conflicts of water
supply, use, and diversion to the exclusion of issues of land use,
natural stream corridor maintenance, and adaptive watershed
management.8 3
III. TRUE HYPOTHETICALS AND REVISIONIST
CERTAINTIES
A. Beaver Lodges and Artificial Obstructions
Beavers are a frequent problem for riparians and water re-
source managers, who receive landowners' many calls of inquiry
79. Id. § 15-1503(1), (2); see also 6 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 6, § 601
(2007) (outlining the permit application and project signoff procedures).
80. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-1503(1); 6 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit.
6, §§ 608.1 to .5 (2007). The statutory permit considerations give little by the way of
public guidance or assurances: "The department shall ascertain the probable effect on
the health, safety and welfare of the people of the state, and the effect on the natural
resources of the state likely to result from the proposed project or work." N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 15-0503(2)(a).
81. See N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-0701(1).
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and complaint.8 4 Not only can beavers contaminate the water
they frequent, but their lodges and dams regularly cause water-
courses to back up and overflow properties upstream.85 In 1990,
for illustration, titleholders to twenty-seven acres in Saratoga
County were unsuccessful in their attempts (as invitees) to trap
the beavers that had "set up housekeeping" on their neighbors'
land and had flooded their own tract and well. Hoping perhaps
that a judge could wield a beaver drain tube more skillfully than
they, the injured property owners took their neighbors to court.86
The Appellate Division ruled, however, that "[o]wners of rural
land have no affirmative duty to remedy conditions of a purely
natural origin upon their property, in this instance the work of
wildlife, even though such conditions may cause inconvenience or
even damage to the property or neighbors."87
The implications of the holding are as unambiguous as the
holding itself: Riparians are not obliged to clear natural obstruc-
tions from their streams, which may take the form of leaves, log-
jams, or sedimentation, even when flooding and damage ensues.88
Conversely, these landowners need not confer benefit on other ri-
parians by maintaining artificial obstructions such as a dam
that-if preserved from gradual decay due to inattention and neg-
84. Telephone Interview with Erin Heard, Outreach Coordinator, Ctr. for Inte-
grated Watershed Studies, Upper Susquehanna Coalition (Sept. 29, 2005).
85. See generally N.Y.S. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Beaver Damage Control
Techniques Manual, httpJ/www.dec.ny.gov/animals/6992.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2008) (presenting a natural history of beavers in the Empire State and tips on dealing
with their presence on private property).
86. Frank v. Garrison, 584 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1992).
87. Id.; cf. Cooper v. Sharon Springs Cent. Sch. Dist., 777 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565-66
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 2004) (finding triable issues of fact in allegations that much of the
debris and sediment removed from a limestone cavern, which formerly served as a
natural storm drain for the local watershed, resulted from defendant's negligent fail-
ure to mitigate erosion at his jobsite).
88. See Garrison, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 218. Regardless whether they are themselves
riparians, municipalities are similarly not responsible for preventing floods. See
O'Donnell v. City of Syracuse, 76 N.E. 738, 740 (N.Y. 1906) (applying the general rule
where a municipality utilized Onondaga Creek as an open trunk sewer); cf. City of
Schenectady v. Furman, 15 N.Y.S. 724, 727-28 (Sup. Ct. Gen. Term 3d Dep't 1891)
(determining that even were a municipality to have properly established a "natural
and normal grade" for Mill Creek, it did not have the right to excavate defendant
riparian's streambanks and trees). Absent negligence, these smaller subdivisions of
government are also not liable for any flood-related damages. Cf Office Park Corp. v.
County of Onondaga, 409 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857-59 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1978) (holding a
municipality liable for failure to follow "sound engineering practice" by jumping the
order of improvements made to sections of Lev Creek).
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/3
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lect-would keep a lake's level constant.8 9 Resonating with the
early riparian cases addressing stream disturbances, the natural/
artificial distinction undergirds the following graphic representa-
tion of the common law scheme:
Obstructions & Restorations Interventions
(natural) (artificial)
1. no duty to ameliorate even 2. no duty to maintain even
where damage ensues where benefit conferred
(e.g., beaver case) (e.g., lake level case)
3. [to be proposed by author] 4. duty to ensure that neither
fails nor causes problems-
otherwise liability
(e.g., three dam case)
The resolution of conflicts involving accretion (deposition) pig-
gybacks on the familiar distinction between natural and artificial
obstructions, but necessitates a reinterpretation of the controlling
jurisprudence to comport with contemporary perspectives on the
morphology of New York State's watercourses. Most rivers-even
models flowing in perfectly uniform soil-form S-curve meanders,
which manifest the processes of erosion and deposition.90 Where
moving most quickly (generally along the outside bends), the cur-
rent picks up particles of sand, silt, sediment, gravel, and organic
matter, drops them where the water slows (generally at deeper
pools or near the inside bends), and in this gradual fashion shapes
the river channel.9 1 Riparianism dictates that the affected land-
owners divide the naturally-deposited alluvium proportionate to
89. See Lake Claire Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 626 N.Y.S.2d 540, 540
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995). But ef Hammond v. Antwerp Light & Power Co., 230
N.Y.S. 621, 630-31 (Sup. Ct. Lewis County 1928) (searching for a prescriptive ease-
ment that would allow defendants to draw impounded waters, thus restoring a lake to
its natural level while harming the littoral owners).
90. JAMES A. SIMPSON, RIVER AND LAKE BOUNDARIES: SURVEYING WATER BOUNDA-
RIEs-A MANUAL 157-58, 160 (1994).
91. One watershed activist describes the phenomenon: "A stream is like a snake.
You can hold it by the tail and by its head, but it will keep on wanting to wriggle.
Historically, a stream meanders. Even if you put a road across a valley, and station-
ary culverts to steer the stream, its energy will keep wanting to dissipate." Telephone
Interview with Al Evans, Chair, Concerned Citizens for Catatonk Creek (Nov. 11,
2005). See generally Rick Oestrike, A Short Tutorial on River Types (undated) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author) (depending on slope and substrate, differ-
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the original extent of their respective water frontage.92 Deposi-
tion in one place on the watercourse, however, often implies ero-
sion in another.93 Where instead erosion has occurred, the
riparians proportionately suffer the loss of the now-submerged
land.94
In re City of Buffalo reveals that the common law treatment of
accretion and erosion assumes that these processes are "slow and
gradual," if not "imperceptibl[e]," and originate with "the natural
action of the elements."95 In fact, "progress cannot be always mea-
sured even though results may be discerned from time to time."96
The New York Court of Appeals reasoned in this case that the
need of the owner of the newly-accreted land for certainty in ten-
ure trumps the claims of upstream (or former) riparians as well as
the streambed's owner.97 The upstream riparian's failure to halt
the ongoing erosion advises against future recovery in the form of
reclamation-and then only where the land had been washed
92. See, e.g., Ludington v. Marsden, 586 N.Y.S.2d 165, 169 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1992) (specifying that the litigated properties are ambulatory vis-A-vis the water: de-
scribed in their individual titles as extending to the shore of the watercourse, either
its high water line or mean high water mark, or to the center of its bed, and not as
extending a certain lineal distance or to a specified monument or property line).
93. Site Visit and Interview with Mary Brophy, Envtl. Specialist, N.Y.S. Dep't of
Transp., Lance Lockwood, Manager, Chenango County Soil and Water Conservation
Dist. & Audrey Stone, homeowner, in Plymouth, N.Y. (Mar. 14, 2006). The symmetry
in hydrological systems is apparent in Audrey Stone's DEC permit application to
move 165 cubic yards of freshly-accreted gravel from the far side of Canasawacta
Creek to the severely eroded bank dangerously close to her home and septic and fuel
tanks. Mrs. Stone has lived on the water for some three decades. She lost almost
thirty feet of her back yard-and narrowly missed losing her dog and a recreational
vehicle-in the past eight years. (The permit was finally approved, but the work
could not be financed.) Moreover, partly due to the reconstruction of the next bridge
upstream and changes made to the angle, length, and materials of its abutment, and
partly due to a nearby esker, the bridge immediately downstream of the Stone prop-
erty (close to the intersection of Route 23 and Moon Hill Road) has developed scour
problems and is on the New York State Department of Transportation's flood-watch
list. Id.
94. See, e.g., Trs. of Southampton v. Buoninfante, 756 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 2003).
95. In re City of Buffalo, 99 N.E. 850, 852 (N.Y. 1912).
96. Id. at 852. The case is cited with approval by the more recent Town of Oyster
Bay v. Commander Oil Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that a com-
pany may dredge a harbor to preserve access to its storage terminal, much as it le-
gally could had the state's underwater bed accreted onto the company's own privately-
held riparian lands).
97. See Buffalo, 99 N.E. at 852; cf In re Town of Hempstead, 239 N.E.2d 722,
724-25 (N.Y. 1968) (establishing that a municipality, which condemned shoreline
property, holds the right of accretion even though the original owners maintained
title to the ocean-submerged land).
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/3
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away or so thoroughly submerged for such a length of time that
reestablishing its "identity," should the waters recede, would be
impossible. 98
The basic approach to accretion and erosion moreover dictates
that "[tihis is not the rule where the loss of the land occurs by
avulsion, defined as the sudden or violent action of the elements,
the effect and extent of which is perceptible while it is in progress.
In such cases the boundaries do not change."99 Analogous to the
riparian's lack of obligation to clear natural obstructions from
streams, the case law generally indicates there is no obligation to
maintain earlier ownership patterns when predictable or natural
changes affect the stream corridor.'0 0 Unforeseeable or artificial
changes in water speed, scale, stability, or source, however, sum-
mon a different set of legal consequences entirely.' 0
The problem with applying the rules of riparianism therefore
lies not so much with doctrinal inconsistency, but rather with the
near-impossibility of finding a New York watercourse that is any-
thing but a manmade artifact.'0 2 Indeed, the contours of riparian
tenure should remain constant throughout the Empire State-be-
cause after centuries of human activity, all hydraulic and hydro-
logic changes are in some sense artificial, no matter how gradually
or suddenly they become apparent, and regardless of the particu-
98. See Buffalo, 99 N.E. at 852-53; see also State v. Bishop, 359 N.Y.S.2d 817,
819-820 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1974) (equating gradualness per se with naturalness and
prohibiting reclamation where the high-water mark of Moriches Bay shifted upward
over twenty-two years: "Whether the erosion of defendant's parcel was caused by the
slow, unassisted workings of natural elements, or by human action affecting the tides,
such as dredging or the digging of mosquito ditches, is irrelevant."). But see In re
Hutchinson River Parkway Ext'n, 14 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1939) (denying explicitly the legal distinction between natural and artificial causes of
deposition and accretion to nevertheless award damages where the erection of flood-
gates by a municipality caused Westchester Creek to submerge private riparian prop-
erty over forty years).
99. Buffalo, 99 N.E. at 852.
100. Cf. Halsey v. McCormick, 18 N.Y. 147, 149 (1858) (preserving original lot lines
where Six Mile Creek, now channelized, abruptly changed course).
101. See, e.g., In re City of New York, 176 N.E. 171, 172 (N.Y. 1931).
102. Cf Olney v. Culluloo Park Co., 169 N.Y.S. 843, 847 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1918)
(Putnam, J., concurring) (attaching riparian rights to a modified watercourse display-
ing the essential features of naturalness: source, outlet, and channel); Spink v. Corn-
ing, 70 N.Y.S. 143, 147 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1901) (prohibiting obstructions to a
watercourse despite earlier modifications to it). But see Letter from Rick Oestrike,
Chair, Fishkill Creek Citizens' Comm., to the author (Aug. 30, 2006) (on file with
author) ("You are approaching this issue as either purely natural or purely artificial
when I view the situation as a spectrum. This spectrum ranges from 100% natural to
100% artificial with most streams somewhere in the middle.").
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lar form they may take. 10 3 For instance, the settlement of the
Southern Tier began in earnest in the 1800s, the lining of its low-
lands with draintiles in the 1850s, and the clearcutting of its hill-
sides in the late 1800s.10 4 As another example, no fewer than
sixteen dams straddle one sixteen-mile stretch of Fishkill Creek in
Dutchess County. 0 5 Consequently, local residents' sense of place
is colored by concerns of dam failure (e.g., flooding homes), 0 6 the
dangers of their removal (e.g., disturbing contaminated sediment,
losing lakeshore lots, uncovering abandoned cribbing, and impair-
ing recreation), 0 7 and their ongoing negative effects (e.g., deposit-
ing sediment and obstructing fish migration).' 08
Near the author's former home in the Finger Lakes, a cross-
ing of Six Mile Creek for cows and tractors exacerbates its fast
flow and high bedload (a condition of much sediment resting
loosely on the underwater bed), which characteristics arise from
the combination of a natural thirty-foot drop in three thousand
feet of shoreline and the site's historic function as a gravel quarry
for local dairies. 0 9 Problems at the site are manifold: approxi-
mately fifteen years ago, a storm took out the Route 79 bridge im-
mediately downstream of the crossing (as well as twenty feet of
103. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
104. Telephone Interview with Al Evans, supra note 91; see also Site Visit and In-
terview with Brophy, Lockwood & Stone, supra note 93 (Lockwood noting: "We need
to do a better job of siting people. Fifty, sixty years ago we put people directly in the
floodplain because we didn't know any better.").
105. Telephone Interview with David Foord, Dir., Envtl. Mgmt. Council of Dutch-
ess County (Nov. 18, 2005).
106. See generally Jesse Sayles, Stream Barrier Inventory and Characterization:
Methodology and Training Manual 1, 2-3, 5 (Dec. 2005) (draft manuscript, on file
with the Hudson River Estuary Program, N.Y.S. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation) (train-
ing laypeople to find and document dams, culverts, and other barriers to smaller
streams, and in this fashion inventorying a surprising forty-nine dams and thirty-four
culverts in the Fishkill Creek Subwatershed).
107. See generally Jim Pizzuto, Effects of Dam Removal on River Form and Process,
52 BIOSCIENCE 683, 683-88 (2002) (describing upstream and downstream changes to
river channels and banks when dams are removed, including the immediate danger
when sediment fill is washed away). For an analysis of the disastrous 1973 removal
of the Fort Edward Dam on the Hudson River, see FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, AM. RIVERS
& TROUT UNLIMITED, DAM REMOVAL SUCCESS STORIES: RESTORING RIVERS THROUGH
SELECTIVE REMOVAL OF DAMS THAT DON'T MAKE SENSE app. A, at 1-4 (Dec. 1999),
available at http://www.foe.org/res/pubs/pdf/successstories.pdf.
108. See generally N. Leroy Poff & David D. Hart, How Dams Vary and Why It
Matters for the Emerging Science of Dam Removal, 52 BIoSCIENCE 659, 659-60 (2002)
(exploring dam-related impairments of watersheds on the local and landscape levels).




road on either side of it),110 and turbidity measures (cloudiness)
commonly approach one thousand NTUs (nephelometric turbidity
units) and may run over five thousand NTUs in a runoff event."1-
In contrast, nine turbidity monitors on the southern end of Ca-
yuga Lake, the source of the Town of Ithaca's drinking water, av-
eraged approximately five NTUs in 2004 and spiked no more than
182 NTUs." 2 For a final illustration, the topography of the steep
Catskills north of New York City has traditionally encouraged
placing homes, fields, and roads in close proximity to the local
streams, which similarly suffer from the lack of choice in location
but unsuccessfully compete for space in the narrow valley
troughs.113
To speak of any one of these watercourses and its changing
morphology as natural, which current case law recommends,
places conflicts over accretion and erosion (as natural obstruc-
tions) squarely in cell 1 of the proposed matrix."1 4 The absence of
a duty to ameliorate a natural obstruction, even where damage
ensues, would preclude riparians' access to the courts in nearly all
such cases and force others to settle for a compromised bundle of
property rights. Imagine a waterfront subdivision featuring
thirty-foot-wide paved roads and four-thousand-square-foot ranch
homes replete with concrete walks and driveways and the occa-
sional patio or in-ground pool. The development could conceivably
funnel sufficient runoff and storm drain effluence over several
years' time to erode a portion of a downstream hobby farm, which
soil may become a sandbar blocking the boathouse of a riparian
even further downstream." 5 Under governing case law, the last-
in-line river rat possesses an assailable claim to the extra acreage
110. Id. See generally MILONE & MAcBROOM, INC., FLOOD MITIGATION NEEDS AS-
SESSMENT: SIX MILE CREEK, TOMPKINS COUNTY, NEW YORK, ES-5, 3-9 to -11 (Oct.
2003), available at http://www.cayugalake.org/sixmilecreek/Milone_ Mac-
Broom-report.pdf (prioritizing restoration of the watercourse from Creamery Road to
Six Hundred Road in light of significant problems due to excessive energy, a discon-
nected floodplain, and repeated landslides).
111. E-mail from Roxy Johnson, Watershed Coordinator, Lab Dir., City of Ithaca
Water Treatment Plant (Dec. 7, 2006) (on file with author). The City of Ithaca draws
its drinking water from Six Mile Creek. Id.
112. See UPSTATE FRESHWATER INSTITUTE, CAYUGA LAKE WATER QUALITY MONITOR-
ING, RELATED TO THE LSC FACILITY: 2004, at 11 (Mar. 30, 2005), available at http:l
www.utilities.cornell.edu/doc/CayugaLake04.pdf.
113. Telephone Interview with Brooks, supra note 31.
114. See graphic representation, supra p. 125.
115. These facts resemble those of Sweet v. New York, 451 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567-68
(Ct. Cl. 1982), which relates the tale of a diversionary channel, a faulty dam, a nearby
riparian's loss of six acres to erosion, extensive silt and gravel deposition approxi-
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as against the eroded-from upstream agriculturalist, but must dig
her canoes out of the muck and portage them to the main current
at her own expense. Similarly, the agriculturist has no certain
legal recourse against the residential developer who set the pro-
cess in motion by laying an expanse of impervious surface over a
water-storing floodplain that had once recharged the stream gen-
tly and only when its basal flow required. 116
This Article instead contends that these kinds of conflicts
would fit comfortably in cell 4 of the proposed matrix: duty to en-
sure that an intervention does not fail. "Not fail" so conceived
might necessitate designing a project according to wet growth
principles, 117 relocating a project to eliminate its likely harmful
effects, or abandoning a project altogether. In sum, the doctrinal
move would permit litigation and the award of monetary damages
(calculated as to present value), or equitable remedies (perhaps
restorative), for the affected riparians within a reasonable statute
of limitations period. Although judges are bound by procedural
and compensatory constitutional protections against takings of
private property without just compensation, 118 some scholars and
activists argue these protections "apply only to a narrow set of ac-
tions; most changes in property and water law are not considered
takings."" 9 Under the right circumstances, New York courts
mately four miles downstream at the site of a dude ranch and golf resort, and the
spoiling of guests' water skiing.
116. Cf Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within Nature's
Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927, 951 (2000) ("Until landowners become responsible
in a cumulative, temporal, and spatial sense for the impact of their land uses on the
health of a watershed, land development and water use will continue to increase vir-
tually without restraint."). But see Trs. of Southampton v. Heilner, 375 N.Y.S.2d 761,
773 (Sup. Ct. Special Term Suffolk County 1975) (entertaining the argument that
heightening tides by opening a formerly landlocked waterbody to the Atlantic Ocean
should result in compensable damages).
117. That is, integrating "concerns about water quality and the availability of
water supply into the density, form, pattern, and location of land development." Ar-
nold, supra note 25, at 8.
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
119. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Takings and Water Rights, in WATER LAw: TRENDS,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 43, 50 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond eds.,
1995). But see Tarlock, Potential Role, supra note 11, at 228-31 (noting two contradic-
tory trends in takings law as applied to biologically sensitive lands: (1) state property
rights legislation and compensation, and (2) state regulation mixed with compensated
and uncompensated land acquisition, the latter including substitute compensation
such as transferable development rights). The possibility of a taking in this context
concerns judicial takings, or the idea that a state court decision may benefit the public
and deprive a property owner of value without just compensation. See generally W.
David Sarratt, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487,
1497-1512 (2004) (tracing the uneven history of the judicial takings doctrine and ar-
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/3
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would thus be properly charged with responding to the deepening
scientific knowledge and evolving societal needs around riparian
lands.120
B. Highways and Floodways
The previous section distinguished between natural obstruc-
tions to watercourses and interventions that are the byproducts of
human activities purporting to do something other than alter the
hydrology of a watershed. This section instead focuses on direct
stream interventions that attempt to mediate a watercourse (to
control floods or overflow by bringing a stream back or close to its
natural state) or to remediate it (to calm the flow by removing or
softening past interventions). It begins by contending that an
evolving riparianism should classify natural stream restoration
efforts as a positive duty: To foster stream corridor health through
locale-appropriate best management practices and water or land
interventions. 121 The duty would constitute a facet of the stan-
dard maxim of nuisance liability, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
guing that takings protections should constrain judges as well as executives and
legislators).
120. State law does not create property rights, but with the passage of time might
foster certain expectations and understandings of ownership, as might the custom
and practice of a given community. See Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d
1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691,
715 (1832): "The court not only may, but are [sic] bound to notice and respect general
customs and usage as the law of the land, equally with the written law, and when
clearly proved, they will control the general law . . . .") (emphasis added); Kim v. City
of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 809 (1997) (find-
ing no taking where (1) both the common law and the city charter obliged a private
landowner to provide lateral support for an adjacent public roadway and (2) a filed
map reflected a property's legal grade prior to conveyance to plaintiff. "It would be an
illogical and incomplete inquiry [into the background restrictions on land ownership,
which existence might suggest against a compensable taking, see Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)] if the courts were to look exclusively to
common-law principles to identify the preexisting rules of State property law, while
ignoring statutory law in force when the owner acquired title.") (citations omitted).
But see Gazza v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1039
(N.Y. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 813 (1997) (finding no taking where setback re-
quirements were in effect at the time of claimant's purchase because "a promulgated
regulation forms part of the title to property as a preexisting rule of State law. While
the remaining interests may still be freely transferred by the landowner, a pur-
chaser's title is necessarily limited to and by those property interests alone.") (empha-
sis added).
121. In other words, "Stream management is floodplain management." Site Visit
and Interview with Olvany, supra note 20.
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laedas, or to use one's property without injuring the property of
another, 122 and occupy cell 3 of the proposed matrix:
Obstructions & Restorations Interventions
(natural) (artificial)
1. no duty to ameliorate ... 2. no duty to keep in
existence...
3. duty to foster stream corridor 4. duty to ensure does
health through locale-appropriate not fail...
best management practices and
water or land interventions-
otherwise nuisance liability
might ensue
When limning the contours of the proposed restoration duty,
it is helpful to remember at the outset that "stream self-help" does
not qualify as a best management practice though it may be up-
permost in the minds of rural riparians. "Our creek is filling in
and spreading out," laments a homeowner along Canasawacta
Creek. "No one is maintaining it. They [the New York State De-
partment of Transportation] used to take a bulldozer and clean it
out every year. Now they don't and our stream needs fixing."123
The driving force behind the Upper Susquehanna Coalition also
observes good-naturedly, "Stream walks! That's so mid-Hudson
Valley. Here people just want to take out their big equipment and
bulldoze the stream. Remove the gravel and deepen the chan-
nel."124 Similarly, Schuyler County Soil and Water Conservation
District personnel report:
We have a situation [on Chequaga Creek, a tributary to Jackson
Creek] where the highway superintendent is blaming the land-
owner, saying, "You should have cleaned your stream. If you
had, it would not have blocked the bridge to flood the neighbor."
But generally, people want to get into their streams, they want
to bulldoze the heck out of them. It's our long-term project to
have them be gentle with the geomorphology, but they see
gravel bars as bad, although we know that they shift.
122. See, e.g., Musumeci v. New York, 351 N.Y.S.2d 211, 215 n.3 (App. Div. 4th
Dept. 1974).
123. Interview with Christina Franklin, homeowner, in Plymouth, N.Y. (Mar. 14,
2006).
124. Telephone Interview with James Curatolo, Watershed Coordinator, Upper




In fact, the gravel situation has gotten worse. The highway
people claim they can buy cheaper [than dredging stream chan-
nels], but it is a resource right in front of them and they want to
get at it. It makes them mad they can't get at it. Contractors
will even mine for gravel, but they say they are doing it to deal
with emergency flooding. 12 5
On the contrary, dredging stream channels and removing ob-
structive point bars (sediment temporarily stored on the inside
edge of bends) ameliorate only the most immediate of flood dan-
gers and only for a short while. Not only might a stream's energy
pull more gravel from the streambed or bank to replace the
dredged material, but a "hungry" current will incise its channel to
cause faster flows and additional undercutting, erosion, and po-
tential liabilities downstream. 126
Another contentious riparian issue in New York State today
concerns diffuse surface waters that flow onto an adjacent prop-
erty, or flow into a watercourse which then floods an adjacent
property. Like the doctrine of accretion and erosion, New York's
common law of diffuse surface waters exemplifies modern judicial
respect for the natural/artificial distinction as a baseline for anal-
ysis and supports the positive duty to foster stream corridor
health. 127 Specifically, "[a] riparian owner may not cause water to
discharge into a natural stream in such quantity as to exceed its
125. Telephone Interview with Elaine Dalrymple, Project Manager, Schuyler
County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. (Nov. 15, 2005).
126. See generally NAT'L WATER AND CLIMATE CTR., STREAM VIsuAL ASSESSMENT
PROTOCOL 1 (1998), available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/ technical/ECS/aquatic/
svapfnl.pdf ("A stream is a complex ecosystem in which several biological, physical,
and chemical processes interact. Changes in any one characteristic or process have
cascading effects throughout the system and result in changes to many aspects of the
system.").
127. See generally Peter N. Davis, Drainage, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 59.02(b), (b)(2)-(4), (b)(7) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed., 1998 repl. vol.) (presenting
the three rules of diffuse surface waters at common law: the common enemy rule
(water as a scourge), the civil law rule-natural flow (drainage to follow its natural
direction), and the comparative reasonable use rule (drainage not to interfere with
neighbors' use of their land)). Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140 (1881), first expressed
New York's law in this area; admittedly, its approach to the common enemy rule (now
modified) ultimately emphasized a natural understanding of a different kind: "But
those laws [i.e., the legality of intercepting surface waters before they join a water-
course and preventing underground waters from supplying a neighbor's spring] are to
be construed in connection with social laws, and the laws of property. The interfer-
ence in these cases with natural laws, is justified, because the general law of society
is, that the owner of land has full dominion over what is above, upon or below the
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natural capacity.... However, as long as the natural capacity of
the stream is not exceeded, a riparian owner may increase the
quantity of water placed into such stream."128 A landowner may
thus grade his parcel regardless of impact on surface water flows
provided (1) the improvements are made in good faith to meet the
most naturally suitable use of the land and (2) water is not di-
rected onto other properties via artificial means such as "pipes,
drains, channels, or ditches. 1 29
Some courts are predisposed towards a formal approach to
these two elements. In Long v. Sage Estate Homeowners Associa-
tion, Inc., defendant's new berm funneled sheeting stormwater
into an existing swale that ran downslope and onto plaintiffs
property. 30 The intermediate court intuited that the earthmov-
ing led to an artificial and hence impermissible collection of water,
this although the swale was a natural feature of the landscape
and hence the directing berm arguably constituted a good faith
improvement sufficiently appropriate to the local topography to
insulate defendant from liability. 31 Following true Romanticism,
today's Empire State courts have adopted "natural" as shorthand
for bona fides: good faith, appropriateness, a right. (But when de-
termining naturalness becomes an intuitive rather than a critical
enterprise, the resulting judicial pronouncement may indeed be
romantic!)
The law of diffuse surface waters technically does not belong
to the ad hoc patchwork that is riparianism: its case law concerns
direct overflow onto neighboring properties rather than into a wa-
tercourse and thence to affect riparian holdings. 132 When unable
128. Stanklus v. County of Montgomery, 448 N.Y.S.2d 536, 537 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1982).
129. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Appleman, 501 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1986); Grosso v. Long Island Lighting Co., 424 N.Y.S.2d 979, 981 (Dist. Ct. 4th Dist.
Nassau County 1980). See also Seifert v. Sound Beach Property Owners Ass'n, 303
N.Y.S.2d 85, 89 (Sup. Ct. Special Term Suffolk County 1969) (finding actionable negli-
gence where defendants should have reasonably anticipated the need to control the
surface waters that flowed onto plaintiffs' land upon removal of a sand dune and
opening of a formerly impassable roadway).
130. Long v. Sage Estate Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 792 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (App. Div.
3d Dep't 2005).
131. See id. But see Archambault v. Knost, 518 N.Y.S.2d 243, 244 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1987) (finding for defendants who filled in a natural catch basin shared by the
neighborhood and partially blocked a historic drainage ditch to the rear of their prop-
erty, despite the fact that one defendant explained he had "'soaked up the water for
the people up the street for 30 years and he figured if he filled his property, the people
up the street could take care of their own water problems.'").




to seep into the ground, however, storm runoff and other surface
waters become sheeting flows or channelized rivulets that end up
in streams, rivers, and lakes to contribute to pollution and loss of
water quality, erosion and flooding, and sedimentation and dimin-
ished aquatic life. 133 It is not too hard to envision a concerned
riparian requesting-under threat of suit-her upstream (or
downstream) counterpart to remove the pavement, storm drain, or
catchment that has accelerated or enlarged their common water-
course with measurable damage to her property or her enjoyment
of the river or stream. 134 Truly, "individual action can be steward-
ship; it also can be litigation."135
Specifically, the pipes, drains, channels, or ditches disallowed
under the law of diffuse surface waters are close functional rela-
tions to structural stream interventions such as concrete section-
ing, culverts, and bridge abutments, and also to habitual stream
interventions such as cleaning, fording, dredging, and cropping.
Within an expanding riparianism, two possibilities for complaint
arise. The aggrieved riparian could argue according to cell 4 of the
proposed matrix that her neighbor's structure or practice is an in-
tervention now failing. Any of these interventions, however, may
represent misguided attempts to mediate (or at least negotiate)
the watercourse, and defendant could argue that its utility to him
outweighs its damage to another riparian and to overall stream
health. Alternatively, defendant could argue with some serious-
ness that the complainant (1) cannot convince the intervention is
problematic, (2) must prove the existence of the intervention in
the first place, or (3) should invest in this form of stream control,
too.
Faced with the likelihood of such a response, or faced with a
situation in which the upstream riparian has changed the
stream's hydrology and hydraulics through habitual practices and
not construction projects, plaintiff would do well to frame her com-
133. See N.Y.S. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION & N.Y.S DEP'T OF STATE,
STORMWATER MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR LocAL OFFICIALS: CONSTRUCTION
AND POST-CONSTRUCTION STORMWATER RUNOFF MANAGEMENT 1-3 (2004), available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/9007.html (click individual chapter titles under "Re-
lated Links").
134. Cf Musumeci v. New York, 351 N.Y.S.2d 211, 215-16 (App. Div. 4th Dept.
1974) (holding the state liable for utilizing drainage ditches, a culvert, and a concrete
arch beneath a highway to collect diffuse surface waters and discharge them into
Waterhouse Creek, which flooded plaintiffs' land).
135. Interview with Deb Grantham, Ass't Dir., Nat. Res. and Env't, Cornell Univ.
Coop. Ex't, in Ithaca, N.Y. (Nov. 15, 2005).
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plaint within cell 3. Bounded where applicable by the dictates of
municipal immunity, statutes of limitation, and foreseeability, she
could remind the court that historic and contemporary riparian-
ism have honored a naturalism broader than the pre-industrial
doctrine of natural flow: in consumption limited to primary needs,
in disallowed extraordinary methods of using water, and in the
approval-by-acceptance given to natural obstructions, natural
morphological changes, and natural carrying capacity. A positive
duty to remediate streams by imitating natural patterns merely
evolves past undertakings of the common law into a more knowl-
edgeable and sensitive age. 136
136. One can push the assertion of a knowledgeable and sensitive age only so far.
Support, however, may be found in the changes made by Skaneateles to its zoning
law. (The rural-and-resort town is situated on the northern tip of Lake Skaneateles
in the Finger Lakes region.)
Until 1996, hedges were permitted on residential lots in the area between the
house and the lake if they were shorter than six feet. See TOWN OF SKANEATELES,
N.Y., CODE § 148-11(G)(1) (1996). In response to complaints the law was amended to
read: "No fence, hedge, berm, or wall, except retaining walls parallel to the lake line
and seawalls, shall be permitted within one hundred feet of the lake line. No fence,
hedge, berm or wall exceeding four feet in height shall be permitted in the lake yard."
See id. § 148-11(G)(1) (1998). While addressing blocked views, this language prohib-
ited the very thing promoted through educational programs for lakefront property
owners: planting vegetation near the shoreline to anchor the soil and prevent bank
sloughing. See E-mail from Lee Macbeth, Watershed Control Coordinator, Dep't of
Water, City of Syracuse, to author (undated) (on file with PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
REVIEW).
At some point residents pointed out this tension to the town, which in 2000
changed the zoning law to permit hedges within one hundred feet of the lake line,
albeit ones shorter than four feet with a fifty percent visual penetration. See id.
§ 148-11(G)(1) (2000). The municipal government of Skaneateles, however, still re-
fused to decrease the fifteen percent impervious surface coverage allowed for lots
outside the Watershed Overlay District despite pressure from Syracuse, which relies
on unfiltered lake water for its drinking water supply. See Telephone Interview with
Lee Macbeth, supra (Mar. 7, 2006).
Similarly, municipalities served by a single aquifer often utilize their zoning law
to ramp up from wellhead protection to watershed protection. See, e.g., CROTON-ON-
HUDSON, N.Y., CODE § 223-17 (1989), available at http://village.croton-on-hud-
son.ny.us/Home (click "Village Code" then enter the section number in the "Search
Request" form). More creatively yet, the lakeside community of Gorham has estab-
lished a "timber harvesting district" within which all loggers must incorporate certain
best management practices into their work: securing a slope of less than fifteen per-
cent for haul roads and skid trails, promptly removing any logging slash and debris
from stream channels, and maintaining a "no harvest zone" within fifteen feet of all
streambanks. See GORHAM, N.Y., CODE § 31.32(F). Compare SOUTH BRISTOL, N.Y.,
CODE § 106-6(F) (proposing that the Code Enforcement Officer supply logging permit
applicants with information about best management practices), and N.Y.S. DEP'T OF
ENVTL. CONSERVATION, SAMPLE LOCAL LAW FOR STORMWATER MANAGEMENT AND ERO-
SION AND SEDIMENT CONTROL art. 1, §§ 1.1 to .9 & art. 2, § 3.1 (Mar. 2006), available
at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water-pdf/localaw06.pdf (presenting model regulations
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/3
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If the decisionmaker not only acknowledges this precedent,
but also accepts the scientific and policy assumptions shoring the
concept of a positive duty, the intervening riparian cannot suc-
cessfully counter, "I am not directing waters into the stream
which would not have reached it otherwise; my good faith interfer-
ence with the stream should be judged solely by its limited effects
in one particular spot and is de facto appropriate to the local land-
scape."137 Likewise, the non-riparian defendant landowner can-
not claim that his activities, such as logging or building, do not
affect the distant watercourse.138 In rebuttal, the aggrieved ripa-
rian may emphasize awareness of at least the most basic water-
shed best management practices in communities throughout New
York State. 39
for stormwater management, construction controls, and site design to minimize hy-
drologic response to development), with N.Y.S. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, TIM-
BER HARVESTING GUIDELINES, available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water pdf/
swdmchapter5.pdf (suggesting ways to handle the problems of soil erosion, siltation,
and general ugliness that arise during logging jobs), and CTR. FOR WATERSHED
PROTECTION, NEW YORK STATE STORMWATER MANAGEMENT DESIGN MANUAL 5-1-9,
available at http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/dow/toolbox/swmanual/chapter5.pdf
(recommending certain stormwater treatments and pretreatments that reduce runoff
from construction zones).
137. Cf Faith R. Kearns et al., A Method for the Use of Landscape Metrics in Fresh-
water Research and Management, 20 LANDSCAPE ECOLOGY 113, 113-15, 121-24 (2005)
(advising the use of shape- and extent-based (pattern) over percentage-based (compo-
sition) metrics in watershed studies to measure the impact of landscape-scale land
use on water quality, especially within progressively urban watersheds).
138. See Allan, supra note 2, at 258, 263-67 ("[R]iverine landscapes increasingly
are viewed as 'riverscapes' ... Hundreds of studies document statistical associations
between land use and measures of stream condition using multisite comparisons and
empirical models, and collectively these studies provide strong evidence of the impor-
tance of surrounding landscape and human activities to a stream's ecological integ-
rity."); Clarke, supra note 25, at 442-46 (endorsing an "eco-hydromorphic approach to
sustainable river restoration" which is sensitive to a breadth of spatial and temporal
scales: from catchment area to individual pool-riffle sequences and from geological
time to seasonal changes).
139. The earlier depiction of a belief in stream "self-help" among rural New York
riparians makes any claim for widespread knowledge of basic watershed protection
suspect. Nevertheless, as the existence of the many educational publications cited in
this Article attest, this is a half-fulllhalf-empty sort of issue. As further support, FIN-
GER LAKES LANDSCAPES: LANDSCAPING FOR WATER QUALITY IN THE FINGER LAKES RE-
GION (2006), an outreach effort of the Cornell University Cooperative Extension of
Onondaga County, is now in its second printing. One watershed educator takes stock:
"Of the ten-to-fifteen percent [of the general population residing on a lake or water-
course or otherwise having a potentially direct impact on a floodplain in the Finger
Lakes], there is an overall sense of importance to protect the lakes and perhaps some
knowledge of general themes. When it comes to specific practices-then it gets
sketchy. The real education takes place when I see an individual problem and work
with the landowner or builder to fix it." Site Visit and Interview with Olvany, supra
note 20. His "personal pet peeve" is hay bales. Many builders think that placing a
33
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C. Unreasonably Disappearing Streams
Because unreasonably disappearing streams connect to the
proposed matrix as a sort of intervention (cell 4), it would be an
oversight not to examine how New York's riparianism has gradu-
ally embraced a conjunctive approach by equating groundwater
pumping with surface water diversions that diminish instream
flows. 140 The initial absence of an integrated perspective is
neither unique to the state nor traceable to one particular factor:
Blame for the failure of the courts to recognize many of these
developments [particularly the discovery that groundwater does
not run in channels like diffuse surface water, but rather fills
the interstices of its substrate] may lie partly with the technical
experts who hesitate (because of a fear that such presentation
will not 'get over' with the court) to present ground water situa-
tions in the light of the latest knowledge available regarding
them, and partly with the courts themselves, who, for their
knowledge of a very complicated technical subject, rely too
greatly upon legal decisions written by men who, though well
grounded in the law, are not familiar with the fundamental
principles of ground water hydrology. Thus a vicious circle ex-
ists .... 141
Complicating the matter, one Rockland County public health
engineer reports "the science [for understanding groundwater]
has been somewhat sketchy" due to the highly individualized geo-
logic features of each and every community. 142 That being said,
hay bale in the path of effluence from a jobsite will force the water to pool and heavier
sediments to precipitate before the water seeps through the organic fibers and contin-
ues downslope. Actually, the water noses around the fibers and increases the sedi-
ment load headed towards the lake or watercourse. The bales should instead be
opened and the hay spread like mulch over the disturbed soil. See id.
140. See generally Peter N. Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo.
L. REV. 189, 204-34, apps. I & 11 (1972) (providing a fine-grained analysis of ground-
water cases throughout the riparian states and calling for the widespread adoption of
correlative rights, which treat groundwater as a usufructory resource available for
private use only as balanced against the equities of conflicting users).
141. Samuel C. Wiel, Law and Science: Their Cooperation in Groundwater Cases,
13 S. CAL. L. REV. 377, 378 (1940) (quoting California civil engineer Donald M. Baker)
(citation omitted); see also Tarlock, Property Rights, supra note 68, at 86-87 (identify-
ing problems with the separate allocative regime for groundwater under riparianism).
142. Telephone Interview with Catherine Quinn, Sr. Public Health Eng'r, Envtl.
Health Div., Health Dep't, Rockland County (Nov. 23, 2005). Given that Rockland
County supplies over two-thirds of its drinking water from groundwater, she advo-
cates mapping the Ramapo-Mahwah Aquifer (which as a point of interest is charac-
terized by Triassic sandstone, a highly productive rock that "holds much water and
yields much water"). See id.
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groundwater doctrine simultaneously represents a substantial
chapter in the history of the state's riparianism and a plausible
road map for its ongoing contribution to "a new narrative of own-
ing," one which will "promote land health and at the same time
respect the individual, encourage enterprise, and allow for private
rights in land."143
By conceptually isolating "percolation or underground cur-
rents" from a "spring or open, running stream," early decisions
seamlessly followed the English rule of the absolute ownership of
groundwater upon a landowner's capture of it, even when a neigh-
bor claimed a related decrease in his water supply.14 4 In 1888, the
New York Court of Appeals flatly dismissed the conjunctive ap-
proach: "No stream or water-course ran from the [defendant's]
spring. The source from which it came, and the flow of its waste or
surplus, were alike under-ground, concealed, and matters of spec-
ulation and uncertainty .... [Nione of the rules relating to water-
courses, and their diversion apply."1 45 Yet four years later, an in-
termediate court managed to rely on this unequivocal precedent to
find contractors of the City of Brooklyn liable for reducing the
level of James Brook, which fed plaintiffs pond.' 46 Calling the
case "a very simple action, and based upon well-defined principles
of law," the judge implicitly accepted the conjunctive approach: al-
though the municipality had the right to lay a conduit across or
Responding to Ms. Quinn, it is fair to state that the basic parameters of ground-
water-surface water interaction are by now understood. If the level of a watercourse
is lower than the water table (i.e., the water level of the local aquifer), the stream
gains water from the aquifer; if the stream level is lower than that of the water table,
the stream loses water to the aquifer. Sooner or later equilibrium is reached. GLEN-
NON, supra note 22, at 42-43. Because well withdrawals typically exceed the rate at
which groundwater flows towards the well, the falling water table forms a drain vor-
tex (cone of depression) centered on the well casing. Id. at 42. The vortex expands in
pace with the withdrawals until it reaches a river or stream-the base flows of which
may already be compromised due to a lowered water table elsewhere in the watershed
or to upstream diversions of surface supply-and captures those waters directly. See
id. at 46-47.
143. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, BOUNDED PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LANDS: ENVISIONING A NEW
LAND ETHIC 109, 111 (1998).
144. See, e.g., Village of Delhi v. Youmans, 45 N.Y. 362, 363 (1871); see also Ellis v.
Duncan, 21 Barb. 230, 233-34 (Sup. Ct. Gen. Term N.Y. County 1855) ("To award
compensation for, or prevent the infliction of such injuries, would seriously arrest the
march of improvement, and often so seriously impair the use of property as to render
it of little or no value.").
145. Bloodgood v. Ayres, 15 N.E. 433, 434 (N.Y. 1888). By this time, in contrast,
the reasonable use doctrine as applied to rivers and streams was a tenet of New
York's riparianism. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.




PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
through its own land, and to consume any amount of subterra-
nean water, riparian doctrine still prohibited "interfer[ing] with
some stream or pond above ground."147 Put another way, if the
effects of diverting groundwater were unknowable and unpredict-
able, the court deemed it unfair for liability to attach to its use-
but by the same token, liability would accompany each incremen-
tal notch of familiarity and foreseeability, here achieved through
the visible changes to surface waters. 148
The doctrine continued to move rapidly, if stepwise. In Smith
v. City of Brooklyn, decided in 1897, an intermediate court found
that "the whole spring level of the surrounding country has been
lowered, and running streams and ponds dried up .... It needed
no occult power to foresee that the construction of these water
works would drain a large part of the territory contiguous
thereto... ,,149 Perhaps motivated by the egregious municipal in-
tent, the Smith court made a doctrinal leap by discovering incon-
sistency in a rule that gives the right to use a stream and the right
to destroy that very same stream to competing persons.150 In an-
other municipal pumping case four years later, the state's highest
court seized upon the "wells and pumps of such pervasive and po-
tential reach that from their base the defendant can tap the water
stored in the plaintiffs land, and in all the region thereabout, and
lead it to his own land, and by merchandising it prevent its return
.... ,151 Discounting the value of an urban water supply relative
to plaintiffs celery and watercress crop, it too applied riparian
doctrine and the artificial/natural distinction to groundwater by
affirming the lower finding of New York City's trespass beyond
the boundaries of its two-acre Spring Creek Pumping Station.152
147. See id. at 219-20.
148. Hearkening back to Mr. Baker's observation, see supra note 141 and accompa-
nying text, it is worth noting that the court believed it equally plausible that ground-
water would run in channels or exist freeform; still, the notion of "subterranean water
having no definite channel" was certainly mysterious, perhaps exceptional See Cov-
ert, 21 N.Y.S. at 220.
149. Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 46 N.Y.S. 141, 144 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1897).
150. See id. at 147 (ordering a new trial).
151. Forbell v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644, 646 (N.Y. 1900). See also Hathorn v.
Dr. Strong's Saratoga Springs Sanitarium, 106 N.Y.S. 553, 555 (Sup. Ct. Special Term
Saratoga County 1907) (viewing the decisions in Forbell and Smith as relying upon
the proposition that using artificial means to attract or divert percolating waters from
another's property represents an unreasonable acquisition of those waters).
152. See Forbell, 58 N.E. at 646. The court's characterization of the use of the
water as commercial and distant sounds in the conservatory prohibition against non-
riparian use, but the opinion belies this interpretation by suggesting the city could




Despite these legal developments, the two-step between hy-
drology and His or Her Honor remains an untutored dance. 153 In
a case decided forty years ago, Stevens v. Spring Valley Water
Works and Supply Company, a longtime resident of Rockland
County alleged that a clean and year-round stream (witnessed as
flowing at the same depth of four-to-six inches in 1892) ran dry
after private water supplier Spring Valley Water Works (now
United Water New York) tied a new well, situated approximately
one thousand feet from plaintiffs property, to its distribution sys-
tem.'54 At trial, a battle of the experts ensued. A sanitary engi-
neer opined that the lowering of the water table in the stream's
catchment area caused the watercourse to disappear, and a
groundwater geologist testified that the well drew its water from
below an impenetrable layer, a source distinct from the percolat-
ing groundwater above the overburden that once fed the now-de-
funct stream. 55 Upholding the jury's return of damages for the
plaintiff and by-and-large ignoring the competing causalities
presented, the appellate court extended the rule of reasonable use
to the conflict at bar because the stream's "destruction was com-
plete, as its source of life was cut off."' 56 One could read the deci-
sion, like the court suggests, as though the plaintiff had a property
interest in the existence of the stream itself-and not merely a
153. A line of reservoir heightening cases ran contemporaneously to the ground-
water pumping cases, likewise prompting creativity among New York judges. In
Pixley v. Clark, defendants sought to escape liability because it was not evident how
constructing an embankment along a watercourse, upstream of their dam, saturated
plaintiffs' adjacent property. See 35 N.Y. 520, 530 (1866). The chiefjudge responded:
"The defendant, then, is as much answerable for it as one would be who choked an-
other to death, though it should be proved that science was utterly unable to declare
how life should entirely leave the body by mere pressure upon the throat for a couple
of minutes." Id. He then shied from "the mysteries that attend the circulation of
subterranean water" to ground the ruling for plaintiffs in the traditional, but argua-
bly inapposite, prohibition against interfering with surface streams. Id. at 530-31.
Cutting the other way, the New York Court of Claims in Flanigan v. New York simi-
larly refused to address the plausibility of plaintiffs hypothesis, namely that con-
struction of the Champlain Canal lowered the regional water table and depleted her
wells thereby. See 183 N.Y.S. 934, 935 (Ct. Cl. 1920). Rather, the court fell back on a
unique doctrinal mix of the absolute ownership of groundwater and sic utere to deny
her claim for damages See id. at 938, 939.
154. Stevens v. Spring Valley Water Works & Supply Co., 247 N.Y.S.2d 503, 504,
505 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1964).
155. See id. at 505-06, 506-07.
156. See id. at 510-11 (quoting Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 46 N.Y.S. 141, 146 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1897)).
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liability-bounded usufruct in the molecules of water already flow-
ing past his door.157
Fast forward to 2002, when employees of the Rockland
County Environmental Health Division were compelled to sus-
pend their assignment to collect water quality samples at stream-
tributary nodes upon discovering that the Mahwah River had dis-
appeared, as had Cherry Brook along Pascack Road. 158 The dis-
turbing phenomenon only confirmed a most dramatic occurrence
in 1981: the level of the Ramapo River dropped significantly dur-
ing a pump test of ten wells newly-drilled by United Water New
York. 159 Based on the modern precedent of Stevens v. Spring Val-
ley Water Works and the increasingly ardent quest to understand
local ground-to-surface hydrologic connections, 160 it is not incon-
ceivable that a private and non-statutory cause of action lies for
riparians along similarly depleted watercourses assuming (1)
measurable damages for diminished use and enjoyment or real es-
tate value and (2) an identifiable agent and precipitating event. 161
IV. CONCLUSION
State statutory permitting requirements for water usage,
which purportedly supersede common law riparian doctrine, fail
to address a major concern pertaining to the quality and quantity
of water supplies throughout the eastern United States: how to
maintain and restore stream corridor health in light of ongoing
157. See id. at 510.
158. Telephone Interview with Quinn, supra note 142.
159. See id. The Bureau of Water Resources at DEC recommended conditioning
the company's permit: should the flow of surface water dip below eight million gallons
per day, the groundwater pumping would be drastically reduced or stopped alto-
gether. Id
160. See, e.g., Letter from Shannon Martin LaFrance, Dutchess County Legislator
(17th Dist., Fishkill, N.Y.) and Mary M. Swartz, Dutchess County Legislator (12th
Dist., East Fishkill, N.Y.) to Chairman Brad Kendall and Legislators, Dutchess
County Legislature, N.Y. (Oct. 6, 2005) (on file with author) (calling for, inter alia,
updates to reports that identify groundwater availability and analyze build-out and
safe well yield for different land uses, and assessments of the utility of input/output
studies for the Wappingers Creek, Ten Mile River, and Fishkill Creek Watersheds).
The Dutchess County Legislature is currently funding the Groundwater Supply
Tracking Project to identify "early warning signs of aquifer stress from drought condi-
tions and development." See Water and Wastewater Authority, Dutchess County, NY
Online: Mission Statement, http://www.dutchessny.gov/CountyGov/Departments/
WaterandWaste/WRIndex.htm (last visited January 24, 2008).
161. Cf. Hathorn v. Dr. Strong's Saratoga Springs Sanitarium, 106 N.Y.S. 553, 559
(Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1907) (declining to award plaintiffs more than nominal





development pressures and the iterative effects of past abuses. It
is the premise of this Article that the colorful cases of historic and
modern riparianism are crucial to fostering locale-appropriate
best management practices as well as water and land interven-
tions through their rejection of artificiality and concurrent sympa-
thy towards adaptive watershed management. Specifically, these
tendencies encourage development that is proportionate to natu-
ral stream size and strength and congruent with presently-ac-
cepted forms of water consumption, presume temporariness
regarding manmade changes to watercourses and (more funda-
mentally) regarding manmade watercourses, favor gradual hy-
draulic shifts, disallow conveyances and pathways for water not
the original streambed, and prohibit the use of strong wells and
pumps that bring overmuch groundwater to the surface. Against
the long history of agricultural and industrial settlement in New
York State, which has irrevocably changed the state's fluvial geo-
morphology, a realistic return to the natural state of dynamic
equilibrium requires nothing less than calculating an imitation of
erstwhile stream flows, and then funding, engineering, and imple-
menting their restoration.
Seen this way, the answer to the overarching theoretical
question of who owns the stream becomes the answer to the bless-
edly practical question of who holds title to the riparian lands and
what she expects as an owner. By all accounts, the agrarian prop-
erty regime marked by natural flow had succumbed around the
turn of the nineteenth century to the march of progress and the
liability regime of beneficial use. We now see a return to a prop-
erty regime, but one-to paraphrase Smith v. City of Brooklyn
from the nineteenth century and Stevens v. Spring Valley Water
Works from the twentieth-that generates an interest in the exis-
tence of the stream itself, measured in large part by a healthy and
dependable base flow year-round. New and more subtle grounds
for complaint are emerging. As one hypothetical, if a stream
moves away from a recorded shoreline boundary due to an oppo-
site riparian's annual dredging, the owner of the eroded parcel
should be afforded opportunity to litigate for return of the shore-
line acreage (resurvey) and prompt rehabilitation of the obstruc-
tion (either retrofit or removal, here understood as cessation of the
destructive habitual practice). 162
162. The scenario raises the possibility that were plaintiff to prevail and the up-
stream riparian's property subdivided to restore the equivalent of the eroded land,
plaintiff might acquire title to parcels on both sides of the watercourse. Under New
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This Article proposes a variety of additional grounds for ripa-
rian suit, such as enjoining the clearing of an obstructive point
bar, forcing the redesign of a poorly located stormwater conduit, or
seeking damages for the drying up of a beautiful river. Consider-
ing that the "wall of environmental law enacted in the 1970s re-
mains . . . tremendously valuable at slowing disaster, but [is]
ultimately not enough without additional systemic changes, '" 163
small-time litigation within the ambit of the common law repre-
sents a populist, place-by-place, and potentially equitable tool to
convert the rights of one landowner to riparian health into the du-
ties of another to act or to forebear in effecting changes to a water-
course.164 As the evolution of New York's groundwater doctrine
illustrates, courts' incremental approach justifiably infuses "what
the law is" with "what the law ought to be" when faced with an
increasing number of land use conflicts around related issues; the
judiciary is educated, in the best of cases, by deepening scientific
understanding of geologic and ecologic phenomena.165
Indeed, riparianism is best known for its historically instru-
mentalist character in meeting the paired societal demands for re-
source allocation and wealth distribution:
The judicial elimination of the natural flow doctrine's veto
power over development, a traditional privilege of the landed
York's source-of-title test, the intervening neighbor could then, unbelievably, lose all
his accustomed riparian rights depending on the configuration of his original parcel.
See discussion, supra note 64.
163. Peter M. Lavigne, The Movement for American Ecosystem Restoration and In-
teractive Environmental Decisionmaking: Quagmire, Diversion, or Our Last, Best
Hope?, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 7 (2003). See generally MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER & TED
NORDHAUS, THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM: GLOBAL WARMING POLITICS IN A POST-
ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD 8-10 (2004), available at http://www.thebreakthrough.org/
images/Death of Environmentalism.pdf (attributing to the powerful legislation that
birthed the modern environmental movement in the United States a narrow confi-
dence in policy proposals for technological remedies which is ineffective against main-
stream ideology).
164. See DeWitt John, Civic Environmentalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
RECONSIDERED 219, 222, 226 (Robert F. Durant et al. eds., 2004). But see Eric T.
Freyfogle, Eight Principles for Property Rights in the Anti-Sprawl Age, 23 WM. &
MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 777, 784-85 (1999) ("[Pleople acting separately simply
lack the powers and options that communities possess, and lack too the time and
knowledge to understand many [environmental and land use] problems [that] can be
understood and described only on a scale well above the individual land parcel.").
165. See generally Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecologi-
cal Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 849-71
(1994) (tracing the influence of ecological studies on environmental law and policy:





gentry, greatly benefited a growing entrepreneurial middle
class. Access to water power was no longer confined to the rich
who could harness the stream and return it unchanged all
within the boundaries of their land .... Water power was now
available at a competitive price to all who could afford a small
tract suited for a mill seat."166
This classic interpretation of wholesome entrepreneurship,
carried out at the fall of a river or on a robust yet thinly-settled
stream, meshes remarkably well with pragmatic instrumental-
ism, which became recognizable as a homegrown American legal
theory soon after reasonable use became firmly entrenched in
New York's riparianism. 167 Ensuring the effectiveness of legal ac-
tion despite the certain need for trial and error in times of rapid
change, "the theory is pragmatic in its emphasis on the primacy of
context in arriving at law's ends and means, stressing time, place,
circumstance, and particular wants and interests rather than ide-
ology, abstract theory, principle, and an a priori normative view of
the 'nature of things."' 168 Because social reality served as the de-
fining paradigm, and was sufficiently cushioned by hydrological
innocence, water law stayed malleable. Either courts ensured
that the flow of a watercourse remained natural or the needs asso-
ciated with the use of the watercourse counted as natural-but no
judge had ever sought to ensure the abstract and ideological ful-
fillment of natural needs through natural flows!
Paradoxically, that is precisely the goal of the current holistic
view of watersheds and the land and water resources they em-
brace. Whereas it is false to say that regulated riparianism has
supplanted riparianism, it is true to say that alongside regulated
riparianism, the common law doctrine is in the process of sup-
planting itself, creatively and accretively, and potentially enrich-
ing the statutory realm thereby. 169 While instrumentalist and
166. Robert H. Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist
Theory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381, 1394 (1989); cf Jedediah Purdy, The
American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 653, 675-96 (2006) (explaining how contemporaneous economic doctrine and
political culture factored into the repudiation of the English doctrine of waste by the
courts of the early Republic).
167. See Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century
American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory
about Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 862-63 (1981).
168. Id. at 864.
169. See David Schoenbrod, Protecting the Environment in the Spirit of the Com-
mon Law, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY
BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 5, 20 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P.
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needs-based yet, the doctrine is well on its way to a full-fledged
prescriptive and ecological destination, but one no longer alloca-
tive or distributive. Rooted firmly in precedent, today's riparian-
ism is capable of weighing time, place, circumstance, and above
all, a normative view of the "things of nature."
Morriss eds., 2000) [hereinafter COMMON LAW AND ENVIRONMENT]. See generally Jack
Beatson, Has the Common Law a Future?, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 291, 313 (1997) (sug-
gesting that "studying the common law will eventually be like shining an ever
brighter light on an ever shrinking object" if attorneys do not animate statutory ques-
tions with the interpretative principles of the common law); Alexandra B. Kass, Com-
mon Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IowA L. REV. 545, 580
(2007) (concluding, in the face of the "new federalism" and reduced Congressional
ability to regulate broadly on environmental issues, "Efforts to make renewed use of
state common law augmented by statutory policy and data that has been created over
the past thirty years can be justified not only to increase environmental protection,
but also to bring a new coherence to environmental law which has always been a
function of both statutes and common law."). Such calls for a moderated return to the
common law must be differentiated from those voices that ostensibly promote the
common law as a more defensible alternative to environmental protection than the
regulatory state, but truthfully would delight in a market-dominated system which
lacks all limits to private or public action save those secured by purchase. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Paehlke et al., Burning Rivers, Common Law, and Institutional Choice for
Water Quality, in COMMON LAW AND ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 54, 79.
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